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OPTIMAL INVESTMENT WITH VINTAGE CAPITAL:
EQUILIBRIUM DISTRIBUTIONS
SILVIA FAGGIAN [1], FAUSTO GOZZI [2], AND PETER M. KORT [3]
Abstract. The paper concerns the study of equilibrium points, or steady states, of
economic systems arising in modeling optimal investment with vintage capital, namely,
systems where all key variables (capitals, investments, prices) are indexed not only by
time τ but also by age s. Capital accumulation is hence described as a partial differential
equation (briefly, PDE), and equilibrium points are in fact equilibrium distributions in
the variable s of ages. Investments in frontier as well as non-frontier vintages are possible.
Firstly a general method is developed to compute and study equilibrium points of a
wide range of infinite dimensional, infinite horizon boundary control problems for linear
PDEs with convex criterion, possibly applying to a wide variety of economic problems.
Sufficient and necessary conditions for existence of equilibrium points are derived in this
general context. In particular, for optimal investment with vintage capital, existence and
uniqueness of a long run equilibrium distribution is proved for general concave revenues
and convex investment costs, and analytic formulas are obtained for optimal controls and
trajectories in the long run, definitely showing how effective the theoretical machinery of
optimal control in infinite dimension is in computing explicitly equilibrium distributions,
and suggesting that the same method can be applied in examples yielding the same
abstract structure. To this extent, the results of this work constitutes a first crucial step
towards a thorough understanding of the behavior of optimal controls and trajectories
in the long run.
Key words: Equilibrium Points; Equilibrium Distributions; Vintage Capital Stock; Age-
structured systems; Maximum Principle in Hilbert spaces; Boundary control; Optimal
Investment.
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Equilibrium Distributions for Optimal Investment 3
1. Introduction
Computing equilibrium points, or steady states, and describing their properties is one
of the main goals in the mathematics of economic models. This task, when presuming
an underlying optimal control problem with infinite horizon, is already nontrivial with
one state variable, but it becomes harsh when the dynamics of the system are infinite
dimensional, like in cases when heterogeneity/path dependency is taken into account.
This is the case, for instance, of optimal investment with vintage capital (capital stock
is heterogeneous in age, see e.g. [50, 35]), of spatial growth models (capital stock is
heterogeneous in space, see e.g. [18, 34, 19]), of growth models with time-to-build (capital
stock is path dependent, see e.g. [5, 6, 7]), or of models with heterogeneous agents (see
e.g. [67]). In all these examples, equilibrium points are indeed functions (of vintage, or
space, or age) and may be more properly referred to as “equilibrium distributions”. Up to
now such equilibrium distributions have been studied only when the value function of the
control problem is described by an analytic formula – a requirement which is very seldom
met – so that many interesting cases are left out of the picture.
On the contrary, this work addresses the study of equilibrium distributions in cases where
no explicit formula for the value function is available, moreover it does so under the
general assumptions of an infinite-horizon infinite-dimensional control problem with lin-
ear state equation and general convex (concave, in the application) payoff, providing a
theoretical tool that can be used in a variety of applied examples. In fact, the theory
is put immediately into practise for the optimal investment model with vintage capital,
obtaining analytic formulas for the equilibrium distributions, and a complete sensitivity
analysis for some instances of the problem. Hence the paper contains a theoretical and
an applied part, both of equal weight and dignity, whose main achievements are listed
below.
For the general theory (Sections 2, 3 and 4), we reprise and complete the study of the
control problems analysed in Faggian and Gozzi [44]. 1 There Dynamic Programming
(DP) was employed to prove the existence and uniqueness of a regular solution v of
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, as well as a verification theorem implying
existence and uniqueness of optimal feedback controls, and the fact that v coincides with
the value function. Overall and differently from most contributions to the subject, this
work presents an integrated approach between the DP and MP methods of optimal control
theory. In particular:
(a) a co-state is associated to the state variable, and necessary and sufficient conditions
for the optimal path are established in the form of a Maximum Principle (MP)
(Theorem 4.5);
1Note that in this theoretical context, since equilibrium distributions can be seen as points in a suitable
infinite dimensional vector space, a space of functions, they will be still named “equilibrium points”
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(b) the co-state associated to an optimal state is shown to coincide with the spatial
gradient of the value function evaluated at that optimal state (Theorem 4.6);
(c) the definition of two types of equilibrium points is introduced: the stationary solu-
tions of the state-costate system, called MP-equilibrium points, and the stationary
solutions of the closed loop equation (CLE) arising in the DP approach (Definition
4.8), called CLE-equilibrium points;
(d) the relationship between the two types of equilibrium points is explained, and
sufficient (and necessary) conditions for existence of such equilibria are provided
(Theorem 4.10);
(e) two results on the stability of CLE-equilibrium points are given by using or adapt-
ing the existing literature (Propositions 4.15 and 4.16).
It is important noting that the theory cannot be used straightforwardly to treat applied
problems in a satisfactory way. This happens on the one hand because the results in
infinite dimension need to be translated into terms of the application under analysis,
and on the other hand as it may be necessary to exploit the particular structure of the
applied problem to specify formulas for practical use. One example is worked out through
Theorem 5.5, in the case of the model of optimal investment with vintage capital.
In the applied part of this work (Sections 5 and 6), the theoretical results are used on the
optimal investment model with vintage capital deriving:
(e) the existence of MP- or CLE-equilibrium points, which is proven equivalent to the
existence of solutions of a numerical equation explicitly derived from the data;
(f) analytic formulas for MP- or CLE-equilibrium points in some relevant examples;
(g) a sensitivity analysis for some particular sets of data.
In particular, the sensitivity analysis enables the development of new economic results
while analyzing the vintage capital stock model in which revenue is a strictly concave
and linear quadratic function of output, where the strict concavity is caused by market
power on the output market. As is standard in this literature (Feichtinger et al. [50]),
output linearly depends on the capital goods, whereas investment costs are convex and
linear quadratic. We show that the equilibrium distribution capital stock is first increasing
and then decreasing in the age of the capital good. The increasing part is the result of
investment costs being relatively large when capital goods are relatively new. On the
other hand, such investments are attractive due to the long lifetime of new capital goods.
Capital goods of older age have a shorter lifetime. This gives an incentive to reduce
investments in older capital goods, resulting in the fact that the equilibrium distribution
capital stock for old machines decreases with respect to age. We further establish another
non-monotonicity dependence of the equilibrium distribution capital goods level, but now
with respect to the productivity of the capital goods. If productivity is relatively low,
the number of capital goods increases if productivity goes up. This is because a given
capital good produces more so that the firm is more eager to invest in it. On the other
hand, if productivity is relatively large the firm decreases investments, because otherwise
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the firm overproduces resulting in a too low marginal revenue. In other words, some
optimal output level exists and less capital goods are needed to produce this level when
productivity is high.
In conclusion, this work shows how successfully and effectively the theoretical machinery
of optimal control in infinite dimension is in computing explicit formulas and studying
properties for equilibrium distributions, also in absence of an explicit formula for the value
function. We believe that the theoretical tools developed in the first part of this work
can be successfully employed in examples yielding the same abstract structure (like those
mentioned at the beginning of this introduction) and possibly extended to more complex
cases with the use of suitable numerical approximations: this will be the subject of future
work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a family of optimal investment
models with vintage capital. Sections 3 presents the abstract optimal control problem
and shows that the problem contained in Section 2 falls into that wider class. Section
4 is the theoretical core of the paper, where we recall the results obtained with the
DP approach in [44] (Section 4.1), we state and prove first order optimality conditions
in terms of a Maximum Principle (Section 4.2), and we present and discuss the general
results on equilibrium points (Section 4.3). In Section 5, the general results of the previous
sections are applied to the model of optimal investment with vintage capital, providing a
technique to derive analytic formulas for the equilibrium distributions. Finally, in Section
6, a sensitivity analysis is conducted on some instances of the problem of Section 5, i.e.
where both revenues and costs are chosen linear-quadratic. This section also contains
numerical results as illustration. An appendix with proofs of the theorems of Section 4
and 5, as well as some additional results, completes the work.
We remark that he paper is organized as to allow the reader less interested in mathematical
details to approach Sections 5 and 6 without necessarily going through the theoretical
Sections 3 and 4.
1.1. Literature Review. We complete this introductory section with an overview of
literature on vintage capital, and on optimal control of infinite dynamical systems, thereby
explaining what the present paper adds to each field.
From an economic point of view, the paper contributes to the literature of vintage capital
stock models. Such models extend standard capital accumulation models, like, among
many others, Eisner and Strotz [32] and Davidson and Harris [29] where capital goods are
a function of just time. The extension is that also the age of the capital goods is taken into
account. This enables to distinguish different vintages of capital goods so that one could
explicitly analyze issues like aging (Barucci and Gozzi [14]), learning (Greenwood and
Jovanovic [57]), pollution (Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [72]), forest management (Fabbri,
Faggian and Freni [37]), and technological progress (Feichtinger et al. [50]). We consider
the kind of vintage capital stock models where investments in older capital goods are
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possible. This distinguishes the framework to be considered from works like Solow et
al.[69], Malcomson [65], Benhabib and Rustichini [16], and Boucekkine et al. [20, 21, 22,
23].
The first contribution in vintage capital literature, which consider models where invest-
ments in older capital goods are also possible, is Barucci and Gozzi [15]. They consider
the vintage capital stock framework where, as in Feichtinger et al. [49], revenue is linearly
increasing in output, implying that the output price is constant, and linear-quadratic
investment costs. Like in Feichtinger et al. [49], they do derive equilibrium distribution
expressions for capital goods of different ages and corresponding investments. The present
paper generalizes these contributions by obtaining the equilibrium distribution expression
of the capital goods for a model with general concave function.
Barucci and Gozzi [14] extends Barucci and Gozzi [15] by considering technological
progress, while in Xepapadeas and De Zeeuw [72] the production process produces emis-
sions next to products. Both papers keep the revenue linearly dependent on output.
Provided an equilibrium distribution exists, which is not the case when we have ongo-
ing technological progress as in Barucci and Gozzi [14], due to this linearity equilibrium
distribution expressions are much easier to obtain compared to a revenue function being
concave as in the present paper.
Closer to our present paper than the works cited above is Feichtinger et al. [50], in which
also a firm with market power is considered. The difference with our work is that Fe-
ichtinger et al. considers technological progress. In particular, the main part of their
work analyzes how the firm reacts with its investment policy to a technological break-
through, which is a point in time at which a new technology is invented. The implication
is that productivity of the capital goods of vintages borne after the breakthrough time
jumps upwards. Our model is simpler in the sense that we do not consider technological
progress. However, our analysis goes further than in Feichtinger et al. [50] in that we
were able to derive an analytical expression for the equilibrium distribution. This we
could do for a general concave revenue function, where Feichtinger et al. [50] just consid-
ers linear-quadratic revenue. Note that after the technological breakthrough Feichtinger’s
model turns into our model with prespecified revenue function. This implies that also in
their framework a unique equilibrium distribution exists, which can be calculated using
the results of the present paper.
From the point of view of mathematics, the main features of the optimal control problem
here considered are: (i) the linear state equation and the convex cost criterion; (ii) the
presence of a boundary control; (iii) the age structure of the driving operator A in the
state equation.
Optimal control of infinite dimensional systems is the subject of many books and papers
in the recent literature. Among the books in the deterministic case we mention Lions [62]
and Barbu and Da Prato [9], and the more recent ones Li and Yong [63], and Troltzsch
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[71]. For the stochastic case (concerning the dynamic programming approach) one can
see the recent book [36].
Concerning the dynamic programming approach to problems with linear state equation
and convex cost but with distributed control, we refer the reader to Barbu and Da Prato
[9, 10, 11], for some linear convex problems to Di Blasio [30, 31], for the case of constrained
control to Cannarsa and Di Blasio [24], and for the case of state constraints to Barbu,
Da Prato and Popa [12] (see also Gozzi [51, 52, 53] for a generalization of this approach
to the case of semilinear state equations). For boundary control problems we recall, in
the case of linear systems and quadratic costs (where the HJB equation reduces to the
operator Riccati equation) e.g. the books by Lasiecka and Triggiani [60, 61], the book
by Bensoussan, Da Prato, Delfour and Mitter [17], and, for nonautonomous systems, the
papers by Acquistapace, Flandoli and Terreni [1, 2, 3, 4]. For the case of a linear system
and a general convex cost function, we mention the papers by Faggian [38, 39, 40, 41, 42],
and by Faggian and Gozzi [43, 44] (in particular, the theory developed in the last two
works is the starting point for theory in the present paper, and is recalled in Section 4.1).
On the Pontryagin maximum principle for boundary control problems we mention again,
in the linear quadratic case, the books [60, 61, 62] and [17]; in the case of linear systems
with convex cost, e.g., the book by Barbu and Precupanu (Chapter 4 in [13]), and the
papers [8], [58]; for general nonlinear boundary control problems, e.g., [27], [45], [46], [70]
[55] [56]. None of them covers the class of problems treated here.
The main contributions of the present paper with respect to the mathematical literature
quoted above are: (1) the proof of the Maximum Principle for infinite dimensional, infinite
horizon optimal control problems with features (i)− (iii); (2) the co-state inclusion which
reconnects the value function with the co-state; (3) the analysis of equilibrium points of
the control problem.
2. The optimal investment model with vintage capital
We now describe the model of optimal investment with vintage capital, in the setting
introduced by Barucci and Gozzi [15][14], and later reprised and generalized by Feichtinger
et al. [48, 49, 50], and by Faggian [40, 41] and Faggian and Gozzi [43].
The capital accumulation process is given by the following system
(2.1)

∂K(τ,s)
∂τ
+ ∂K(τ,s)
∂s
+ µK(τ, s) = u1(τ, s), (τ, s) ∈]t,+∞[×]0, s¯]
K(τ, 0) = u0(τ), τ ∈]t,+∞[
K(t, s) = x(s), s ∈ [0, s¯]
with t > 0 the initial time, s¯ ∈ [0,+∞] the maximal allowed age, and τ ∈ [0, T [ with
horizon T = +∞. The unknown K(τ, s) represents the amount of capital goods of
age s accumulated at time τ , the initial datum is a function x ∈ L2(0, s¯) (the space of
square integrable functions on (0, s¯)), µ > 0 is a depreciation factor. Moreover, u0 :
[t,+∞[→ R is the investment in new capital goods (u0 is the boundary control) while
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u1 : [t,+∞[×[0, s¯] → R is the investment at time τ in capital goods of age s (hence, the
distributed control). Investments are jointly referred to as the control u = (u0, u1). The
output rate is
(2.2) Q(K(τ)) : =
∫ s¯
0
α(s)K(τ, s)ds,
where α(s) is a productivity parameter. Selling the output to consumers results in an in-
stantaneous revenue, R (Q) , where R is a concave function. Capital stock can be increased
by investing, and investment costs are given by
(2.3) C(u(τ)) ≡ C0(u0(τ)) + C1(u1(τ)) ≡ C0(u0(τ)) +
∫ s¯
0
c1(s, u1(τ,s))ds,
with C1 indicating the investment cost rate for technologies of age s, C0 the investment cost
in new technologies, including adjustment costs, C0, C1 convex in the control variables.
The firm’s payoff is then represented by the functional
(2.4) I(t, x;u0, u1) =
∫ +∞
t
e−λτ [R(Q(K(τ))− C(u(τ))]dτ,
where λ ∈ R is the discount rate. Note that λ is usually assumed positive, but here we
leave the possibility of choosing a negative λ (corresponding, for example, to a negative
interest rate). The entrepreneur’s problem is that of maximizing I(t, x;u0, u1) over all
state–control pairs {K, (u0, u1)} which are solutions (in a suitable sense) of equation (2.1)
and keep the capital stock K(τ, s) nonnegative at all times. Such a problem is known
as vintage capital problem, for the capital goods depend jointly on time τ and on age s,
which is equivalent to their dependence on time and vintage τ − s.
We finally recall the definition of the value function of the problem
(2.5) V (t, x) := inf
u∈Lpλ(t,+∞,U)
I(t, x;u0, u1).
Since R and C are not time dependent it is immediate to see that
(2.6) V (t, x) = e−λtV (0, x) =: V0(x).
Remark 2.1. As a matter of fact, we treat the above problem without the state con-
straints K(τ, s) ≥ 0 for all s and τ , and check that constraints are satisfied a posteriori by
the optimal trajectories of the unconstrained problem. In such a case, those trajectories
are also optimal for the problem with state constraints.
2.1. Revenues and costs. In order to be able to treat optimal investment with vintage
capital into the wider class of abstract problems described in Sections 3 and 4, we specify
the assumptions on revenues R and costs C which ensure that the basic assumptions of
the abstract problem (Assumptions 3.2, (3)-(6)) are fulfilled.
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Assumptions 2.2. (i) R ∈ C1(R), R concave, R′ Lipschitz continuous. Moreover
α ∈ H1(0, s¯)2 and α(s¯) = 0.
(ii) C0(r) and r 7→ c1(s, r) are convex, lower semi–continuous functions, with injective3
subdifferential at all r ∈ R.
(iii) C∗0(r), r 7→ c1(s, ·)∗(r) (are Fre´chet differentiable and) have Lipschitz continuous
derivatives, for all s ∈ [0, s¯].
(iv) C0(r) and r 7→ c1(s, r) are bounded below by a function of type a|r|p + b, for some
a > 0, b ∈ R, p > 1.
In the above statement, we denoted by f ∗ the convex conjugate of a convex function f , in
particular C∗0(r) = supw∈R{wr − C0(w)}, c1(s, ·)∗(r) = supw∈R{wr − c1(s, w)}. Note that
no strong regularity of C is required.
For example, suitable choices for the revenues are the following:
(a) Linear-quadratic: R(Q) = −aQ2 + bQ;
(b) Logarithmic: R(Q) = ln(1 +Q), for Q ≥ 0 and R(Q) = Q for Q < 0;
(c) Power γ ∈ (0, 1): R(Q) = b[(ν+Q)γ−νγ],with b, ν > 0 (ν arbitrary small), for Q ≥ 0
and R(Q) = bγνγ−1Q for Q < 0. Note in particular that this R converges as ν tends to 0
to R(Q) = bQγ, for Q ≥ 0 and R(Q) = −∞ for Q < 04.
Suitable choices for the costs are, once set β = (β0, β1) ∈ R × L∞(0, s¯), with β1(s), β0 ≥
 ≥ 0, q = (q0, q1) ∈ R+ × L2(0, s¯), the following:
(A) Linear-quadratic:
(2.7) C(u) =
∫ s¯
0
[β1(s)u
2
1(s) + q1(s)u1(s)]ds+ β0u
2
0 + q0u0
(B) Linear+quadratic with constrained control:
C(u0, u1) = C0(u0) + C1(u1)(2.8)
= q0u0 + gβ0,M0(u0) +
∫ s¯
0
[
α1(s)u1(s) + gβ1(s),M1(u1(s))
]
ds(2.9)
where
gβ,M(u) =
{
βu2
+∞
|u| ≤M
|u| > M
Such a cost can be easily generalized to a case where u belongs to any compact interval
and not necessarily u ∈ [−M,M ].
2H1(0, s¯) is the space of square integrable functions which admit a square integrable derivative in weak
sense. Continuous functions with piecewise continuous derivatives are included in this space.
3A multivalued function ρ : U → R is injective when ρ(u1) ∩ ρ(u2) = ∅ for every u1, u2 ∈ U , u1 6= u2.
4The definition of R for negative values of Q is needed in order to apply the general theory, although
negative values of Q will never emerge in our calculations. Note also that setting R (Q) = −∞ for Q < 0
is equivalent to require Q ≥ 0 in optimal solutions.
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(C) Linear+Power costs :
C(u0, u1) = C0(u0) + C1(u1)(2.10)
= q0u0 + fβ0(u0) +
∫ s¯
0
[
q1(s)u1(s) + fβ1(s)(u1(s))
]
ds(2.11)
where, for p > 2,
fβ(u) =
{
β [(u+ θ)p − θp]
+∞
u ≥ 0
u < 0
which implies also positivity constraints of the controls.
We treat all of these cases in Section 5. Moreover, in Section 6 we treat the case of
linear–quadratic revenues and costs for which we derive analytic formulas for the long run
optimal couples, and perform a complete sensitivity analysis.
The reader is advised that Sections 3, 4, and the Appendix are devoted to the mathematics
of the general problem and require a good knowledge of functional analysis to be fully
understood. Nonetheless, they may be skipped at a first reading, as the reader will find in
Section 5 the theoretical results translated in terms of the problem of optimal investment
with vintage capital.
3. The theoretical framework
Here we introduce an abstract class of infinite dimensional optimal control problems with
linear evolution equation and convex payoff, in which the control may also act on the
boundary, and address it as (P). Then, in Section 3.3 we show that the optimal investment
model with vintage capital described in the previous section is of type (P).
3.1. Notation. The expression a ∨ b means the maximum of the real numbers a and b.
If X is a Banach space, we indicate its norm with | · |X , its dual with X ′, with 〈·, ·〉X′,X
the duality pairing. When X = V ′ we use for simplicity 〈·, ·〉 in place of 〈·, ·〉V ′,V . If X is
also a Hilbert space, we indicate with (·|·)X the inner product in X.
If X and Y are Banach spaces, then C1(X) denotes all Fre´chet differentiable functions
from X to R, and L(X, Y ) the set of all linear and continuous operators from X to Y ,
with associated norm ‖ · ‖L(X,Y ). Moreover we set
Lip(X;Y ) = {f : X → Y : [f ]
L
:= sup
x,y∈X, x6=y
|f(x)− f(y)|Y
|x− y|X < +∞}
C1Lip(X) := {f ∈ C1(X) : [f ′]L < +∞}
and, for p ≥ 1,
Bp(X, Y ) := {f : X → R : |f |Bp := sup
x∈X
|f(x)|Y
1 + |x|pX
< +∞}, Bp(X) := Bp(X,R),
C([0, T ],Bp(X, Y )) := {f : [0, T ]→ Bp(X, Y ) : f continuous}
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Note that Bp are Banach spaces if endowed with the norm | · |Bp , so that continuity is
intended with respect to such norms. Furthermore, we set
Σ0(X) := {w ∈ C1Lip(X) : w is convex}.
Finally, if X is a Hilbert space and h : X → R is a convex function, then h∗ will denote
its convex conjugate, namely h∗ : X → R, h∗(x) = sup
y∈X
{〈x, y〉 − h(y)}.
3.2. The abstract optimal control problem (P). We consider two real separable
Hilbert spaces V and H with V continuously embedded in H. We identify H with its
dual and we call V ′ the topological dual of V , which we do not identify with V for the
reasons explained in Section 3.3. We then get a so-called Gelfand triple
V ↪→ H ↪→ V ′
We choose V ′ as state space. The control space is the real separable Hilbert space U
(which we identify with its dual U ′). We consider the control system with state space V ′,
control space U , and varying initial time t ≥ 0, described by
(3.1)
{
y′(τ) = Ay(τ) +Bu(τ), τ > t
y(t) = x ∈ V ′,
where A and B are linear operators, possibly unbounded. Moreover, we take a convex
functional of the following type
(3.2) J(t, x, u) =
∫ +∞
t
e−λτ [g0 (y(τ)) + h0 (u(τ))] dτ
where the function g0 and h0 are convex functions. The problem (P) is that of minimizing
J∞(t, x, u) with respect to u, over the set of admissible controls
(3.3) Lpλ(t,+∞;U) = {u : [t,+∞)→ U ; τ 7→ u(τ)e−
λτ
p ∈ Lp(t,+∞;U)},
which is a Banach space with the norm
|u|Lpλ(t,+∞;U) =
∫ +∞
t
|u(τ)|pUe−λτdτ = |e−
λ
p
(·)u(·)|Lp(t,+∞;U).
Remark 3.1. In the above problem no constraints on controls or on states are assumed
although, in economic applications, the state represents capital stock, usually assumed
nonnegative. Here we proceed along with the frequently used idea (see e.g.[35]) to check
ex post that the constraints are satisfied by the optimal trajectories of the unconstrained
problem, so those trajectories are optimal also for the constrained problem.
The basic assumptions on the data are stated below and will hold throughout the paper.
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Assumptions 3.2. (1) A : D(A) ⊂ V ′ → V ′ is the infinitesimal generator of a
strongly continuous semigroup {eτA}τ≥0 on V ′. Moreover there exists ω ∈ R such
that5
|eτAx|
V ′ ≤ eωτ |x|V ′ , ∀τ ≥ 0;
(2) B ∈ L(U, V ′);
(3) g0 ∈ Σ0(V ′)
(4) h0 : U → R is convex and lower semi–continuous, ∂h0 is injective.
(5) h∗0(0) = 0, h
∗
0 ∈ Σ0(U);
(6) ∃a > 0, ∃b ∈ R, ∃p > 1 : h0(u) ≥ a|u|pU + b, ∀u ∈ U ;
(7) λ > ω.
In proving some results we will need to specify the assumption (7) above as follows.
Assumptions 3.3. In addition to Assumption 3.2, we require that either
(1) p > 2, λ > (2ω) ∨ ω
or
(2) g0 ∈ B1(V ′).
The adjoint of A in the inner product of V ′ is denoted by A∗, while the adjoint of A with
respect to the duality 〈·, ·〉 in V, V ′ is the unbounded operator A∗1 on V , A∗1 : D(A∗1) ⊂
V → V.
Remark 3.4. We recall that, if a function h : U → R ∪ {+∞} is lower semicontinuous
and convex (and not identically +∞), then the subgradient ∂h is defined as ∂h(u) =
{u∗ ∈ U : h(v) − h(u) ≥ 〈u∗, v − u〉U , ∀v ∈ U}. Moreover if ∂h is injective then h∗ is
Fre´chet differentiable with (h∗)′(u) = (∂h)−1(u) for all u ∈ U .
3.3. Optimal investment with vintage capital is of type (P) . We end the section
by showing that the problem of optimal investment with vintage capital described in
Section 2 falls in the general class (P) described above and refer interested readers to [41]
for full detail.6
We at first formulate an intermediate abstract problem inH = L2(0, s), the space of square
integrable functions of variable s, using the modified translation semigroup {eA0t}t≥0 on
H, namely the linear operators eA0t : H → H such that
[eA0tf ](s) = f (s− t) e−µt, if s ∈ [t, s], and [eA0tf ](s) = 0 otherwise.
5When ω > 0, a semigroup S(t) with this property is usually called a pseudo-contraction semigroup,
as e−ωtS(t) is a contraction semigroup with generator A− ωI.
6See also [33], [17] or [68] for the general theory of strongly continuous semigroups and evolution
equations.
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If H1(0, s¯) = {f ∈ L2(0, s) : f ′ ∈ L2(0, s)}, then the generator of {eA0t}t≥0 is the operator
A0 : D(A0) ⊂ H → H, with
D(A0) = {f ∈ H1(0, s¯) : f(0) = 0}, A0f(s) = −f ′(s)− µf(s).
The adjoint of A0 is then A
∗
0 : D(A
∗
0)→ H with
D(A∗0) = {f ∈ H1(0, s¯) : f(s¯) = 0}, [A∗0f ](s) = f ′(s)− µf(s),
generating itself a modified translation semigroup {eA∗0t}t≥0 on H, given by[
eA
∗
0tf
]
(s) = f (s+ t) e−µt, if s ∈ [0, s− t], and [eA∗0tf] (s) = 0 otherwise.
The control space is U = R×H, the control function is a couple
u ≡ (u0, u1) : [t,+∞)→ R×H,
and the control operator is given by
Bu ≡ B(u0, u1) = u1 + u0δ0, for all (u0, u1) ∈ R×H,
δ0 being the Dirac delta at the point 0. With this notation, the original state equation
(2.1) can be written as
(3.4)
{
K ′(τ) = A0K(τ) +Bu(τ), τ > t
K(t) = x,
Note that H and U are Hilbert spaces, and that B is unbounded, meaning that it is
not a continuous operator from U to H (unless u0 = 0, corresponding to identically null
boundary control u0(τ)), for the Dirac delta does not lie in H. Then (3.4) needs to be
interpreted in a suitable way, for instance in an extended state space.
Then we generalize all previous notions to a wider space. We set V ≡ D(A∗0), and assume
V ′ as state space of the abstract problem. Indeed by standard arguments (see e.g. [33,
Section II.5]) – and in particular by replacing the scalar product in L2 with the duality
pairing 〈φ, ψ〉 with φ ∈ V ′, ψ ∈ V (coinciding with the inner product in L2 when φ ∈ L2)
– the semigroup {eA0t}t≥0 can be extended to a strongly continuous semigroup {eAt}t≥0
on V ′, by setting
(3.5) 〈eAtφ, f〉 = 〈φ, eA∗0tf〉 for every f ∈ V, φ ∈ V ′,
The generator of {eAt}t≥0 is the operator A : D(A) ⊂ V ′ → V ′, with D(A) = H. Moreover
the semigroup {eA∗0t}t≥0 can be restricted to a strongly continuous semigroup on V , with
generator the restriction of A∗0 to D ((A
∗
0)
2). Such restriction is exactly the adjoint of A
in the duality 〈·, ·〉 and is then denoted, as in the previous subsection, by A∗1.
The role of H is that of pivot space between V and V ′, namely V ⊂ H ⊂ V ′, with
continuous inclusions. The control operator B is then in L(U, V ′). Its adjoint is given by
(3.6) B∗ : V → U, with B∗v = (v(0), v).
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It is also useful to note that A−1 is well defined and that
(3.7) [−A−1δ0](s) = eµs, while [−A−1f ](s) =
∫ s
0
e−µ(s−σ)f(σ)dσ, for all f ∈ H
The target functional is also interpreted on extended spaces once the production function
is described as
(3.8) Q(K(τ)) = 〈α,K(τ)〉
where, the duality pairing 〈·, ·〉 between V and V ′ has replaced the scalar product in L2
in the original definition (2.2) of Q, and c : U → U . Then (2.4) becomes
I(t, x;u0, u1) =
∫ +∞
t
e−λτ [R(〈α,K(τ)〉)− C(u0(τ), u1(τ))]dτ
The firm’s optimal investment problem falls into the wider class described in the next
theoretical sections, provided it is reformulated as a minimization problem, where the
functions g0 and h0 there described are chosen as
(3.9) g0(x) := −R(〈α, x〉), h0(u0, u1) := C(u0, u1).
Indeed the following Lemma holds true.
Lemma 3.5. Assumptions 2.2 imply, along with the above definitions of A and B and
(3.9), that Assumptions 3.2 are satisfied with ω = −µ. Furthermore if p > 2, then
Assumption 3.3 (1) is satisfied. If instead if p > 1 and R has at most linear growth,
Assumption 3.3 (2) is satisfied.
Proof. Assumption 3.2-(1) is satisfied with ω = −µ since, for every φ ∈ V ′ we have, by
definition of V ′
|eτAφ|V ′ = sup
|f |V =1
〈eτAφ, f〉 = sup
|f |V =1
〈φ, eτA∗0f〉 ≤ sup
|f |V =1
|φ|V ′|eτA∗0f |V ≤ e−µt|φ|V ′ .
Assumption 3.2-(2) is trivially satisfied as pointed out above in the definition of B. By
Assumption 2.2, α ∈ V and g0 is a Fre´chet differentiable convex function of x ∈ V ′, with
Fre´chet differential g′0(x) defined by g
′
0(x)[s] = −R′(〈α, x〉)α(s) . Such differential is a
Lipschitz continuous function of x, with Lipschitz constant Lip(g′0) = Lip(R
′)|α|2V , as
(3.10) |g′0(x)− g′0(y)|V ≤ |R′(〈α, x〉)−R′(〈α, y〉)||α|V ≤ Lip(R′)|〈α, x− y〉||α|V
≤ Lip(R′)|α|2V |x− y|V ′ .
so that Assumption 3.2-(3) holds true. Assumptions 2.2(ii) coupled with Remark 3.4
implies both Assumptions 3.2 (4) and that h∗0 is convex and Fre´chet differentiable. The
fact that h∗0 has Lipschitz differential is implied by (iii), so that also (5) holds true. Clearly
(iv) implies (6). The last statement is straightforward. 2
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Remark 3.6. It is important to note that, in the case when the functions R and C are
both quadratic, neither (1) nor (2) are satisfied in Assumption 3.3. Nonetheless necessary
and sufficient conditions of optimality (see Theorem 4.5) hold true, and the value function
results regular (see Remark 4.4 and Section 5.2.1 for details).
4. Equilibrium points
Although the core of the section is the definition of equilibrium points of the abstract
problem (P) and the investigation of their properties, some results are needed beforehand.
Those obtained via Dynamic Programming, and contained in [44], are recalled for the
reader’s convenience in Section 4.1. On the other hand, Section 4.2 contains new material,
and in particular a version of the Maximum Principle for problem (P). Finally Section
4.3 contains the analysis of equilibrium points.
4.1. Dynamic Programming for problem (P). We here recall the main results con-
tained in [44]. If the value function is defined as
(4.1) Z(t, x) = inf
u∈Lpλ(t,+∞;U)
J(t, x, u),
and, if one sets Z0(x) := Z(0, x), then Z(t, x) = e
−λtZ0(x), so that the Hamilton–Jacobi–
Bellman equation associated to the problem by means of Dynamic Programming reduces
to that with initial time t = 0, that is
(4.2) − λψ(x) + 〈ψ′(x) , Ax〉 − h∗0(−B∗ψ′(x)) + g0(x) = 0, x ∈ H
(with ψ the unknown) whose candidate solution is Z0(x). We refer to p 7→ h∗0(−B∗p) as
to the Hamiltonian function.7
Definition 4.1. A function ψ is a classical solution of the stationary HJB equation (4.2)
if it belongs to Σ0(V
′) and satisfies (4.2) for every x ∈ D(A).
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumptions 3.2 and 3.3 hold. Then there exists a unique classical
solution Ψ to (4.2) and it is given by the value function of the optimal control problem,
that is
Ψ(x) = Z0(x) = inf
u∈Lpλ(0,+∞;U)
J(0, x, u).
Once we have established that Ψ is the unique classical solution to the stationary HJB
equation, and since Ψ is Fre´chet differentiable with Lipschitz derivative, we can build
optimal feedbacks and prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. Let Assumptions 3.2 and 3.3 hold. Let t ≥ 0 and x ∈ V ′ be fixed. Then
there exists a unique optimal pair (u∗, y∗) at (t, x). The optimal state y∗ is the unique
solution of the Closed Loop Equation
7Note that the function usually called Hamiltonian would be (p, x) 7→ 〈p,Ax〉 − h∗0(−B∗p) + g0(x).
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(4.3)
{
y′(τ) = Ay(τ) +B(h∗0)
′(−B∗Ψ′(y(τ))), τ > t
y(t) = x ∈ V ′,
while the optimal control u∗ is given by the feedback formula
u∗(s) = (h∗0)
′(−B∗Ψ′(y∗(s))).
where the optimal feedback map x 7→ (h∗0)′(−B∗Ψ′(x)) is Lipschitz continuous.
Remark 4.4. There are relevant cases when Assumption 3.3 is not satisfied. One such
example is the case, important for the applications, when costs g0 and h0 are quadratic
(or linear + quadratic). Nonetheless Theorems 4.3 remains true, with identical proof to
that provided in [44], if the value function Z0 is in C
1
Lip(V
′). Indeed the regularity of Z0
implies that Z0 is a classical solution of the associated HJB equation (4.2) (to this extent
see e.g. [63], ch. 6, Proposition 1.2, p. 225). In the case of quadratic costs, for instance,
one proves that Z0 is itself quadratic, and hence in C
1
Lip(V
′). Note also that if Z0 is not
differentiable, then the closed loop equation (4.3) holds in the weaker sense of (4.8), as
specified in the next section.
4.2. Maximum Principle for Problem (P). The results contained in this section,
namely Theorems 4.5 and 4.6, are new to literature and add to the theory developed
in [38, 40, 41, 43, 44]. They establish a Maximum Principle for the problem at hand,
and connect it to the results on Dynamic Programming contained in those papers. The
reader may find all of the proofs in the Appendix, as well as some additional results. We
advise the reader that, differently from [44] and in view of Remark 4.4, the new results
are proved avoiding Assumption 3.3. As a consequence, if on the one hand the regularity
of the value function Z0 of (P) does not necessarily hold true, on the other hand we are
able to treat the case of the limit exponent p = 2, and hence of quadratic costs g0 and h0,
so important for the applications.
In order to establish a maximum principle, we first need to define a dual system associated
to the mimimization problem. For all fixed x ∈ V ′ and t ≥ 0, we consider the equation
(4.4) pi′(τ) = (λ− A∗1)pi(τ)− g′0(y(τ)), τ ∈ [t,+∞)
where pi : [t,+∞)→ V (the dual variable, or co-state of the system) is the unknown, and
y = y(·; t, x, u) is the trajectory starting at x at time t and driven by control u, given by
(3.1). We assume such equation is also subject to the following transversality condition
(4.5) lim
T→+∞
e(ω−λ)Tpi(T ) = 0.
When necessary, we denote any solution of (4.4)(4.5) also by pi(·; t, x, u) or by pi(·; t, x) to
remark its dependence on the data.
Heuristically speaking, the candidate conditions of optimality associated to the problem
are the following:
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(4.6)

y′(τ) = Ay(τ) +Bu(τ), τ ≥ t
y(t) = x
pi′(τ) = (λ− A∗1)pi(τ)− g′0(y(τ)), τ ≥ t
lim
T→+∞
e(λ−ω)Tpi(T ) = 0,
−B∗pi(τ) ∈ ∂h0(u(τ)), τ ≥ t.
The ODEs for y and pi appearing in (4.6) are intended, as it is usual in these cases, in
mild sense, see Definition A.1 in Appendix A. Moreover, by conjugation formula, we have
(4.7) −B∗pi(τ) ∈ ∂h0(u(τ)) ⇐⇒ u(τ) = (h∗0)′(−B∗pi(τ)).
We refer to (4.7) as to maximum condition. It has to be satisfied for a.a. τ ≥ t.
The conditions listed in (4.6) prove to be necessary and sufficient for optimality for all
p ≥ 2, in the sense specified next.
Theorem 4.5. (Maximum Principle). Let Assumptions 3.2 be satisfied. Let p ≥ 2,
q = p
p−1 and λ > (2ω) ∨ ω. Let t ≥ 0, x ∈ V ′.
(i) Let (u, y) ∈ Lpλ(t,+∞;U)× L1loc(t,+∞;V ′) be a given admissible pair at (t, x). If
there exists a function pi ∈ Lqλ(t,+∞;V ) satisfying, along with u and y, the system
(4.6), then (u, y) is optimal at (t, x) for the problem of minimizing (3.1)(3.2).
(ii) Assume further that, either p > 2 and λ > 0, or p = 2, λ > 0 and ω < 0. Then the
viceversa of (i) holds, i.e., any couple (u∗, y∗) optimal at (t, x) necessarily admits
a costate pi ∈ Lqλ(t,+∞;V ) satisfying, along with u∗ and y∗, system (4.6).
The next theorem containes the so-called co-state inclusion. Note that the case of p = 2 is
discussed separately, as the value function is not necessarily Fre´chet differentiable (unless
Assumption 3.3 holds or ad hoc regularity results are given).
Theorem 4.6. (Co-state inclusion). In Assumptions 3.2, for λ > max{0, ω, 2ω},
suppose that either p > 2, or p = 2 and ω < 0. Let (u∗, y∗) be optimal at (t, x) ∈
[0,+∞)× V ′, and let pi∗(·; t, x) ∈ Lqλ(t,+∞;V ) be the associated co-state. Let also Z0 be
the value function of problem (P). Then
pi∗(τ ; t, x) = pi∗(τ ; τ, y∗(τ)) ∈ ∂Z0(y∗(τ)), ∀τ ≥ t.
where ∂Z0 is the subdifferential of the convex function Z0. If in addition p > 2, then
Z0 ∈ Σ0(V ′) and Z0 coincides with Ψ, so that
pi∗(τ ; t, x) = pi∗(τ ; τ, y∗(τ)) = Ψ′(y∗(τ)), ∀τ ≥ t.
Remark 4.7. Note that, for p ≥ 2 and λ > 0, and by making use of Theorem 4.5, and
of equations (4.6) and (4.7), one obtains
y′(τ) = Ay(τ) +B(h∗0)
′(−B∗pi(τ)), τ ≥ t
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so that the general version of the closed loop equation (4.3) becomes a differential inclusion
(4.8) y′(τ) ∈ Ay(τ) +B(h∗0)′(−B∗∂Z0(y(τ))), τ ≥ t.
also to be intended in mild sense.
4.3. Equilibrium points. We give two different definitions of equilibrium points for
problems (P), and later show to which extent they are equivalent.
Definition 4.8. A MP-equilibrium point of problem (P ) is any stationary solution
(x, pi, u) ∈ V ′ × V × U of (4.6). This is equivalent to require that (x, pi, u) belongs to
D(A)×D(A∗1)× U and satisfies
(4.9)

Ax+Bu = 0
(λ− A∗1)pi − g′0(x) = 0,
u = (h∗0)
′(−B∗pi)).
A CLE-equilibrium point of problem (P ) is any x ∈ V ′ that is a stationary solution of
the closed loop equation (4.8). This is equivalent to require x ∈ D(A) and
(4.10) Ax+B(h∗0)
′(−B∗∂Z0(x)) 3 0.
Remark 4.9. When 0 ∈ ρ(A) and λ ∈ ρ(A∗1), then (4.9) is equivalent to
(4.11)

x = −A−1Bu
pi = (λ− A∗1)−1g′0(x),
u = (h∗0)
′(−B∗pi)).
and (4.10) is equivalent to
(4.12) x ∈ −A−1B(h∗0)′(−B∗∂Z0(x)).
As a consequence of Remark 4.4, the equations (4.8), (4.10) and (4.12) hold as equalities
with Ψ′(x) in place of ∂Z0(x) when Z0 Fre´chet differentiable in V ′ (e.g. when p > 2, or
when regularity can be proven separately).
The proof of the equivalences in the above definition is straightforward as they are based
on standard regularity of convolutions of semigroups. We omit them for brevity.
We have the following result.
Theorem 4.10. Let Assumptions 3.2 be satisfied, p ≥ 2, λ > (2ω) ∨ ω.
(i) Let (x¯, p¯i, u¯) ∈ D(A)×D(A∗1)×U be any MP-equilibrium point. Then the constant
control u¯ is optimal at (0, x¯) and
(4.13) Ax¯+B(h∗0)
′(−B∗(λ− A∗1)−1g′0(x¯)) = 0,
moreover x¯ is a CLE-equilibrium point and
(4.14) ∂Z0(x¯) 3 (λ− A∗1)−1g′0(x¯).
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(ii) Let xˆ ∈ D(A) be a CLE-equilibrium point, λ > 0. Let either p > 2, or p = 2 and
ω < 0. Assume that Z0 is Fre´chet differentiable in V
′. Then (xˆ, pˆi, uˆ), where
pˆi := (λ− A∗1)−1g′0(xˆ) and uˆ := (h∗0)′(−B∗pˆi),
is an MP-equilibrium point, the control uˆ is optimal at (0, xˆ) and Z ′0(xˆ) = pˆi =
(λ− A∗1)−1g′0(xˆ).
One important consequence of the above theorem is that it provides the following equation
for a CLE-equilibrium point (or for the first component of an MP-equilibrium point)
(4.15) Ax+B(h∗0)
′(−B∗(λ− A∗1)−1g′0(x)) = 0.
In addition, whenever 0 ∈ ρ(A) (this assumption is satisfied in the optimal investment
problem with vintage capital described in Section 2) solutions of (4.15) can be regarded
as fixed points of the operator T : V ′ → V ′, defined by
(4.16) Tx := −A−1B(h∗0)′(−B∗(λ− A∗1)−1g′0(x)).
For the applications, the most efficient way of making use of such relations is to rewrite
them in terms of the specific sets of data, and compute when possible the optimal equi-
librium distributions. In particular, in Section 5 we will see how (4.16) is interpreted in
terms of the data of optimal investment with vintage capital, so that fixed points of T
may be directly computed by solving a numeric equation.
However, in the general case, it is possible to provide sufficient conditions for the existence
and uniqueness of a fixed point of the operator T using well known fixed point theorems
although, as one expects, such conditions may hardly be very sharp. To this extent, we
provide here only Lemma 4.11, which is a straightforward application of the contraction
mapping principle.
Lemma 4.11. Let Assumptions of Theorem 4.10 be satisfied. Assume moreover that
λ− ω > ‖(A)−1‖L(V ′)‖B‖2L(U,V ′)[(h∗0)′][g′0].
Then there exists a unique solution x¯ ∈ D(A) to the equation (4.16).
Remark 4.12. The operator T above is considered as an operator from V ′ to itself. Since
its image is contained in D(A), when looking for fixed points, it is also equivalent to look
at it as an operator from D(A) to itself, considered as a subspace of V ′, as done in Lemma
5.4.
Remark 4.13. All above results could be generalized to the case in which we have state
constraints and the function g0 is convex but not necessarily Fre´chet differentiable. This
could be done using the results of [42] and generalizing them to the infinite horizon case,
using the same arguments in [53]. Clearly, at points where g0 is not Fre´chet differentiable,
one would have to choose an element of the subdifferential of g0.
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4.4. Stability. Once existence (and possibly uniqueness) of equilibrium points is proven,
it is possible to study their stability properties adapting known results such as those in
[59] or in chapter 9 in [64], or by direct proof, as we see next. In all cases, stability will
be proven with respect to the topology of V ′. For the reader’s convenience we recall the
definition here below.
Definition 4.14. A CLE-equilibrim point x¯ ∈ D(A) is stable in the topology of V ′ if,
∀ > 0,∃δ > 0 such that, if x ∈ V ′ and x∗(·) is the optimal trajectory starting at x, then
|x − x¯|V ′ < δ ⇒ |x∗(t) − x¯|V ′ < . If in addition limt→∞ |x∗(t) − x¯|V ′ = 0 then x¯ is
asymptotically stable. Finally, if the same property hold true for all x ∈ V ′, then x¯ is
globally asymptotically stable.
The first criterium to establish stability is contained in the following proposition and
makes use of the linearization method. The proof follows from Corollary 2.2 in [59].
Proposition 4.15. (Stability by linearization) Let Assumption 3.2 be satisfied and Ψ ∈
C1Lip. For x ∈ V ′ set f(x) := B(h∗0)′(−B∗Ψ′(x)), and assume that x¯ ∈ D(A) is a CLE-
equilibrium point for (P), that f is continuously Fre´chet differentiable at a neighborhood
of x¯, and denote by σx¯ the spectrum of the operator A+ f
′(x¯). If sup(Reσx¯) < 0, then x¯
is stable in the topology of V ′. Moreover, it is also asymptotically stable in the topology
of V ′. If sup(Reσx¯) > 0, x¯ is unstable in the topology of V ′.
Another result that can be used is the following. Recall that 〈·, ·〉V ′ indicates the inner
product in V ′.
Proposition 4.16. (Stability by dissipativity) Let Assumption 3.2 be satisfied and let
Ψ ∈ C1Lip(V ′). For x ∈ V ′, and f(x) = B(h∗0)′(−B∗Ψ′0(x)), and assume that, when
x ∈ D(A), the solution of the closed loop equation
(4.17)
{
y′(t) = Ay(t) + f(y(t)), t > 0
y(0) = x,
belongs to D(A) for all t ≥ 0. Let x¯ ∈ D(A) be a CLE-equilibrium point for (P). Assume
that A + f is dissipative near x¯, i.e. there exists an open ball I(x¯) in V ′ centered at x¯,
and ξ ≤ 0 such that, for every x ∈ I(x¯) ∩D(A),
(4.18)
(
A(x− x¯) + f(x)− f(x¯)∣∣x− x¯)
V ′ ≤ ξ|x− x¯|2V ′ .
Then x¯ is stable in the topology of V ′. If ξ < 0 then x¯ is asymptotically stable in the
topology of V ′. If A + f is dissipative on the whole V ′ and ξ < 0 then x¯ is globally
asymptotically stable.
Corollary 4.17. Let the assumptions of Proposition 4.16 be verified, except (4.18). Let
the operator A satisfy (Ax|x)V ′ ≤ −θ|x|2V ′, for all x in V ′, with θ > 0 a fixed constant.
If there exists a neighborhood I of x¯ where f is Lipschitz continuous (in the topology of
V ′) with Lipschitz constant strictly smaller than θ, then x¯ is asymptotically stable in the
Equilibrium Distributions for Optimal Investment 21
topology of V ′. If f is Lipschitz continuous in V ′ with Lipschitz constant strictly smaller
than θ then x¯ is globally asymptotically stable.
In particular, the above corollary may be applied to the examples in Section 5, see e.g.
subsection 5.2.1.
5. Application to Optimal Investment with Vintage Capital
The aim of this section is to show how valuable our general theory can be when analyzing
specific applications, and in particular when trying to derive analytic formulas for equilib-
rium distributions. This process unfolds by computing MP-equilibrium/CLE-equilibrium
points for that problem rephrased in abstract form as in Section 3.3.
We begin by noting that the value function V (t, x) = e−λtV (0, x) = e−λtV0(x) of the
optimal control problem described in Section 2 (see (2.5)), satisfies, as a consequence of
(2.4), (3.9) and (4.1),
V0(x) = −Z0(x)
where Z0 is the value function, defined in Section 4.1, of the abstract problem (P) for
t = 0. Note that V0 is a concave function, as Z0 is convex. Note also that, under
additional assumptions (e.g. Assumption 3.3, or regularity assumptions on Z0), Z0 is
the unique classical solution of HJB equation (4.2) in the sense of Definition 4.1. As a
consequence, the natural co-state for the maximization problem would be
ζ(τ, s) = −pi(τ)[s],
with pi the co-state of the abstract problem whose properties are described in Theorem
4.5 and 4.6. Then the optimality conditions (4.6) for a triplet (K∗, ζ∗, u∗) can be written
as the following set of equations
(5.1) u∗0(τ) = (C
∗
0)
′(ζ∗(τ, 0)), u∗1(τ, s) =
(
(C∗1)
′(ζ∗(τ, ·)))[s] = [c1(s, ·)∗]′(ζ∗(τ, s))
(5.2) ζ∗(τ, s) =
∫ s
s
e−(λ+µ)(ξ−s) R′
(∫ s
0
α(θ)K∗(τ + ξ − s, θ)dθ
)
α(ξ)dξ;
(5.3) lim
T→+∞
e(λ−ω)T ζ(T, s) = 0, a.a. s ∈ [0, s¯].
(5.4)
K∗(τ, s) =

e−µ(τ−s)x(s− τ + t) + ∫ τ−t
0
e−µσu∗1(τ − σ, s− σ)dσ s ∈ [τ − t, s], τ ∈ [t, s+ t]
e−µ(τ−s)u∗0(τ − s) +
∫ s
0
e−µσu∗1(τ − σ, s− σ)dσ s ∈ [0, τ − t], τ ∈ [t, s+ t]
0 s ∈ [0, s], τ ∈ (s+ t,+∞)
Note that (5.1) and (5.2) are derived from (4.6) by making use of (4.7) and (A.15), while
(5.4) is well known and can be obtained by means of characteristics method (see e.g. [14]).
The following proposition is an immediate consequence of Theorem 4.5 and of Lemma
3.5.
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Proposition 5.1. Under Assumptions 2.2, with p ≥ 2 and λ > 0, the optimality condi-
tions (5.1)(5.2)(5.4) are necessary and sufficient for a couple (u∗, K∗) to be optimal at x
for the problem of optimal investment with vintage capital described in Section 2.
5.1. Characterization of Equilibrium Points. It is natural to define an equilibrium
point for the problem consistently with Section 4.3. For the reader’s convenience, Defini-
tion 4.8 is reformulated below in terms of the problem of optimal investment with vintage
capital.
It is important to note that an equilibrium point is actually a function of the variable s
(although independent of t) dependent on the variable s, hence an equilibrium distribution.
Definition 5.2. In reference to the the optimal investment problem with vintage capital:
(i) a MP-equilibrium point is a stationary solution (x, ζ, (u0, u1)) ∈ L2(0, s¯) ×
H2(0, s¯)× (R× L2(0, s¯)) of the system of equations (5.1)(5.2)(5.4);
(ii) for V0 Fre´chet differentiable, a CLE-equilibrium point is any x ∈ L2(0, s¯) which is
a stationary solution of equation (5.4) when
u∗0(τ) = [(C
∗
0)
′(V ′0(K
∗(τ, ·))][0], u∗1(τ, s) = [(C∗1)′(V ′0(K∗(τ, ·)))] [s].
Remark 5.3. Several remarks are here due.
(1) Theorem 4.10 implies, in the assumptions of Proposition 5.1 that (i) and (ii)
are equivalent in the following sense: the first component x of a MP-equilibrium
point (x, p, (u0, u1)) is also a CLE-equilibrium point; conversely, when V0 is Fre´chet
differentiable, a CLE-equilibrium point x can be used to build a MP-equilibrium
point by means of (5.1)(5.2)(5.4), having x as first component.
(2) If V0 is not Fre´chet differentiable, the closed loop equation (as well as the definition
above) may be generalized to a differential inclusion in the sense of (4.8), where
V ′0 is replaced by the superdifferential ∂V0.
(3) Definition 5.2 is consistent with Definition 4.8 as here D(A) = L2(0, s¯) and
D(A∗1) ⊆ H2(0, s¯).
We further characterize MP-equilibrium/CLE-equilibrium points as fixed points of a suit-
able operator. To this extent we define
(5.5) α¯(s) =
∫ s¯
s
e−(µ+λ)(σ−s)α(σ)dσ
i.e. α¯(s) is the discounted return associated with a unit of capital of vintage s.
Lemma 5.4. Under Assumptions 2.2, x¯ is a CLE-equilibrium point if and only if it is a
fixed point of the operator T : L2(0, s¯)→ L2(0, s¯) defined by
(5.6) (Tx)[s] = (C∗0)
′ (R′(〈α, x〉)α¯(0)) e−µs +
∫ s
0
e−µ(s−σ)[c1(σ, ·)∗]′ (R′(〈α, x〉)α¯(σ)) dσ,
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that is, if and only if (T x¯)[s] = x¯(s) for a.e. s in [0, s¯]. Moreover (x¯, ζ¯, (u¯0, u¯1)) where
(5.7) ζ¯(s) = R′(〈α, x¯〉)α¯(s), u¯(s) = (h∗0)′(B∗ζ¯)(s), for a.e. s ∈ [0, s¯]
is a MP-equilibrium point.
The proof of the lemma is contained in Appendix C.
Note that solving the equation Tx = x within a space of functions is not particularly
handy. Nonetheless solving such functional equation is equivalent - and in the generality
of cases - to solving a numeric equation. In this sense, the following theorem contains the
most interesting result of the section.
Theorem 5.5. Let Assumptions 2.2 be satisfied, and let T be given by (5.6). Moreover,
for any η ∈ R and s ∈ [0, s¯], consider the function
(5.8) F (η)[s] = (C∗0)
′ (ηα¯(0)) e−µs +
∫ s
0
e−µ(s−σ)[c1(σ, ·)∗]′ (ηα¯(σ)) dσ.
Then x¯ ∈ L2(0, s¯) is a solution of Tx = x, if and only if
(5.9) x¯(s) = F (η¯)[s]
with η¯ a solution in R of
(5.10) η = R′(〈α, F (η)〉).
The proof of the theorem is contained in Appendix C.
Remark 5.6. Note that the solution of (5.10) is unique and nonnegative when, for
instance, R′(〈α, F (0)〉) ≥ 0. Indeed R′ is decreasing and C∗0 and c1(σ, ·)∗ are convex
functions, then the right hand side of (5.10) is a positive decreasing function of η. Hence
the function
(5.11) θ(η) := η −R′(〈α, F (η)〉)
satisfies θ(0) ≤ 0, is strictly increasing to +∞, and hence has exactly one nonnegative
zero.
Note that (5.6) and (5.9) are general formulas, holding for any choice of costs and revenues,
as long as they satisfy Assumptions 2.2. More explicit formulas for the optimal equilibrium
distribution may be derived once costs and revenues are further specified.
5.2. Linear-quadratic costs. Now we make formulas more explicit in the case of cost
functions satisfying (2.7). We derive
(5.12) C∗0(p0) =
(p0 − q0)2
4β0
, C∗1(p1) =
∫ s¯
0
(p1(s)− q1(s))2
4β1(s)
ds
so that
(C∗0)
′ (p0) =
p0 − q0
2β0
, (C∗1)
′ (p1)(s) =
p1(s)− q1(s)
2β1(s)
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In this case, (5.6) becomes
(Tx)[s] =
R′(〈α, x〉)α(0)− q0
2β0
e−µs +
∫ s
0
e−µ(s−σ)
R′(〈α, x〉)α(σ)− q1(σ)
2β1(σ)
dσ
= R′(〈α, x〉)w1(s)− w2(s)(5.13)
where w1 and w2 are the positive functions
(5.14) w1(s) =
α¯(0)
2β0
e−µs +
∫ s
0
e−µ(s−σ)
α¯(σ)
2β1(σ)
dσ
(5.15) w2(s) =
q0
2β0
e−µs +
∫ s
0
e−µ(s−σ)
q1(σ)
2β1(σ)
dσ.
If in addition we define the positive coefficients
(5.16) c1 = 〈w1, α〉 =
∫ s¯
0
α(s)w1(s)ds, c2 = 〈w2, α〉 =
∫ s¯
0
α(s)w2(s)ds.
then the following result follows as a consequence of Theorem 5.5.
Corollary 5.7. Let Assumption 2.2 and (2.7) be satisfied. Let w1, w2, c1, and c2 be
defined respectively by (5.14), (5.15) and (5.16). Then (x¯, ζ¯, u¯) is a MP-equilibrium point
if and only if η ∈ R is a solution of
(5.17) η = R′(ηc1 − c2).
and
x¯(s) = −w2(s) + ηw1(s).
and moreover ζ¯ and u¯ are given by (5.7). The constant control u¯ is optimal at x¯, x¯ is
also a CLE-equilibrium point and, if V0 is Fre´chet differentiable, then it is also the unique
CLE-equilibrium point.
Remark 5.8. If the CLE-equilibrium point x¯ identified by Corollary 5.7 is such that
x¯(s) ≥ 0 at all s, then x¯ is also a CLE-equilibrium point for the problem with state
constraints k(τ, s) ≥ 0 for all s and τ (see also Remarks 2.1 and 3.1).
Remark 5.9. Note that Assumptions 2.2 are satisfied here with p = 2, so that V0 is not
necessarily Fre´chet differentiable. That implies that, although the first component x¯ of
a MP-equilibrium point (x¯, ζ¯, u¯) is also a CLE-equilibrium point, the viceversa may fail:
there may be CLE-equilibrium points which do not derive as first components of a MP-
equilibrium point, i.e. solutions of the stationary closed loop equation which fail to be
optimal. For a further discussion on regularity of V0, the reader is referrred to Section
5.2.1.
Once R is chosen, the results in Corollary 5.7 leads to an explicit formula for that CLE-
equilibrium point, as illustrated in the next lemma.
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Lemma 5.10. In the assumptions of Corollary 5.7, there exists a unique CLE-equilibrium
point x¯, described by the formuals below, for the associated choices of the revenue R:
(i) If R(Q) = −aQ2 + bQ, then
x¯ = −w2 − 2ac2 + b
1 + 2ac1
w1;
(ii) If R(Q) = ln(1 +Q), for Q ≥ 0 and R(Q) = Q for Q < 0, then
x¯ = −w2 +
√
(1− c2)2 + 4c1 − (1− c2)
2c1
w1
(iii) If R(Q) = b[(ν+Q)γ−ν], with γ ∈ (0, 1), b, ν > 0, for Q ≥ 0 and R(Q) = γνγ−1Q
for Q < 0, then x¯ = −w2 + η¯w1 where η¯ is the unique positive solution of
η =
bγ
(ν + c1η − c2)1−γ .
(iv) If R(Q) = bQγ, with γ ∈ (0, 1), b > 0, for Q ≥ 0, and R(Q) = −∞ for Q < 0
(case with state constraints) then x¯ = −w2 + η¯w1 where η¯ is the unique positive
solution of
η =
bγ
(c1η − c2)1−γ .
Proof. The proof follows from straightforward computations. 
5.2.1. Stability of Equilibrium Distributions. We close the section on linear-quadratic
costs (2.7) by briefly discussing stability of equilibrium distributions and, in some sub-
cases, the regularity of the value function, by applying the results contained in Section
4.4. The concept of stability here used is that of Definition 4.14, which is natural in this
context. We remark though that the convergence of functions there mentioned (i.e. in
the topology of V ′) is not a convergence in the space L2(0, s¯) but, roughly speaking, the
(weaker) convergence of their primitive functions.
Lemma 5.11. In the assumptions of Corollary 5.7, suppose in addition that the value
function V0 is Fre´chet differentiable, and set ξ = −µ + [V0]L|δ0|2V ′/(4β0), where [V0]L
indicates the Lipschitz constant of the gradient V ′0 . If ξ ≤ 0 (respectively, ξ < 0) then x¯
is stable (resp., asimptotically stable) in the sense of Definition 4.14.
The proof of the lemma is contained in Appendix C.
Remark 5.12. In particular, the previous Lemma applies when R is of the type described
in Lemma 5.10 (i). Indeed with some extra work one shows that in this case the value
function of the abstract problem is of type
Ψ(x) = 〈Cx, x〉+ 〈d, x〉+ e,
for a suitable linear operator C : V ′ → V , d ∈ V and e ∈ R, where V and V ′ are the
spaces introduced in Subsection 3.3. Hence Ψ is differentiable with Fre´chet differential
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Ψ′(x) = Cx + d, and [Ψ]L = ‖C‖L(V ′,V ) (for a proof, we refer the reader to [60], vol 1,
ch.2). This applies in particular to the linear-quadratic examples of Section 6.
5.3. Linear-quadratic costs, constrained control. We now choose costs as in (2.8).
We then derive
g∗β,M(v) = sup
|u|≤M
{
vu− βu2} = { v24β
M |v| − βM2
|v| ≤ 2β M
otherwise
Note that g∗β,M is a C
1 function, with Lipschitz derivative
(
g∗β,M
)′
(v) =

v
2β
M
−M
|v| ≤ 2β M
v > 2β M
v < 2β M
As a consequence, the Legendre transform of C is
C∗(v) = g∗β0,M0(β0 − q0) +
∫ s¯
0
g∗β1(s),M1(v1(s)− q1(s))ds
which is Fre´chet differentiable with differential
(C∗)′ (v)(s) =
((
g∗β0,M0
)′
(v0 − q0);
(
g∗β1(s),M1
)′
(v1(s)− q1(s))
)
while the operator (5.6) is given by
TMx(s) =
(
g∗β0,M0
)′
(R′(〈α, x〉)α(0)−q0)e−µs+
∫ s
0
e−µ(s−σ)
(
g∗β1(σ),M1
)′
(R′(〈α, x〉)α(σ)−q1(σ))dσ
Remark 5.13. Note that, with this choice of costs C, Assumptions 2.2 are satisfied with
p > 2 so that, by Theorem 4.2, the value function V0 is in C
1
Lip. By Lemma 5.4 and
Theorem 5.5 we then get that there exists a unique CLE-equilibrium point, coinciding
with the first component of the unique MP-equilibrium point.
From this point on, one may procede as in the proof of Theorem 5.5 and Lemma 5.10 and
compute CLE-equilibrium points, once the data α, q1, q0 are further specified.
5.4. Power costs. We now choose costs as in (2.10) and set q = p
p−1 . Note that p > 2
implies q ∈ (1, 2). The convex conjugate of the costs are then
(5.18) f ∗β(v) =
{
(βp)1−qq−1vq − θv + βθp
0
v ≥ βpθp−1
v < βpθp−1
with Lipschitz derivative
(5.19)
(
f ∗β
)′
(v) =
{
(βp)1−qvq−1 − θ
0
v ≥ βpθp−1
v < βpθp−1.
As a consequence the Legendre transform of C is
C∗(v) = f ∗β0(v0 − q0) +
∫ s
0
f ∗β1(s)(v1(s)− q1(s))ds,
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which is a C1 function with Lipschitz differential
(C∗)′ (v)(s) =
((
f ∗β0
)′
(v0 − q0);
(
f ∗β1(s)
)′
(v1(s)− q1(s))
)
.
Moreover
T θx(s) =
(
f ∗β0
)′
(R′(〈α, x〉)α(0)−q0)e−µs+
∫ s
0
e−µ(s−σ)
(
f ∗β1(σ)
)′
(R′(〈α, x〉)α(σ)−q1(σ))dσ.
Remark 5.14. Note that Remark 5.13 applies also to this case.
6. Sensitivity analysis in two special cases
We here analyze further the case of linear-quadratic costs discussed in Section 5.2, and
develop sensitivity analysis accordingly. In particular we assume
(6.1) α(s) ≡ α, β1(s) ≡ β0, q1(s) = q0e−ws.
Summing up, the objective functional of the profit maximizing firm is∫ ∞
0
e−λt
(
R (Q (K(t)))−
∫ s¯
0
(
q1 (s)u1 (t, s) +
1
2
β0u
2
1 (t, s)
)
ds
)
dt(6.2)
−
∫ ∞
0
e−λt
(
q0u0 (t) +
1
2
β0u
2
0 (t)
)
dt.
We study separately the cases oflinear-quadratic and power revenues, depicted respectively
in Lemma 5.10 (i) and (iii).
6.1. Linear-Quadratic Revenues. We here assume
(6.3) R(Q) = bQ− aQ2
as in Lemma 5.10 (i), so that the equilibrium distribution there described equals
(6.4) K∗ (s) = −w2 (s) + η w1 (s) ,
in which
w1 (s) =
α
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
e−µs − e−µse−(µ+λ)s¯ + 1− e
−µs
µ
+(6.5)
−e
−(µ+λ)s¯
2µ+ λ
(
e(µ+λ)s − e−µs)) ,
w2 (s) =
q0
2β0 (µ− w)
(
e−ws − e−µs (1− µ+ w)) .(6.6)
and
η =
b− 2ac2
1 + 2ac1
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Figure 1. Capital stock in equilibrium distribution for all ages, s ∈ [0, s¯] , based on the param-
eter values α = 3, β0 = 0.5, µ = 0.2, λ = 0.1, s¯ = 10, q0 = 5, w = 0.25, b = 1, a = 0.00004.
where
(6.7) c1 =
α2
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
1− µ
µ2
(
e−µs¯ − 1)+ 2µ+ λ− 1
µ (2µ+ λ)
e−(2µ+λ)s¯
+
s¯
µ
− 1
(2µ+ λ) (µ+ λ)
+
1− (µ+ λ)
µ (µ+ λ)
e−(µ+λ)s¯
)
,
(6.8) c2 =
αq0
2β0 (µ− w)
(
µ− w − 1
µ
(
1− e−µs¯)+ 1
w
(
1− e−ws¯)) .
The explicit expression for the equilibrium distribution capital stock for every age, K∗ (s) ,
allows us to obtain interesting economic implications. To illustrate, we establish some
numerical results, which mostly are analytically proved as well. We start out from the
following parameter values:
(6.9) α = 3, β0 = 0.5, µ = 0.2, λ = 0.1, s¯ = 10, q0 = 5, w = 0.25, b = 1, a = 0.00004.
The equilibrium distribution capital stock is depicted in Figure 1.
We see that capital goods are non-monotonic with respect to age. To understand this,
Figure 2 depicts equilibrium distribution investment behavior, where investment is given
by
u∗1 (s) =
1
2β0
(∫ s¯
s
e−(λ+µ)(j−s) (b− 2aQ∗)αdj − q0e−ws
)
,
with Q∗ being the production quantity in the equilibrium distribution.
Acquiring capital goods of older age is more attractive because they are cheaper (see
(6.1)). On the other hand their lifetime is shorter, so they generate less revenue, which
make older capital goods less attractive. Figure 2 shows that the last effect dominates
for the older ages. The first effect plays a major role for younger ages. This makes sense
because the convexity of the unit cost of acquisition with respect to age, as expressed in
(6.1), makes that these capital goods get cheaper very quickly for slightly older age.
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Figure 2. Investment in equilibrium distribution for all ages, s ∈ [0, s¯] , based on the parameter
values α = 3, β0 = 0.5, µ = 0.2, λ = 0.1, s¯ = 10, q0 = 5, w = 0.25, b = 1, a = 0.00004.
At first sight it is strange that K∗ (s¯) > 0, because s¯ is the age capital goods are scrapped.
However, the presence of the adjustment costs,1
2
β0 [u1 (t, s)]
2, makes that it is not optimal
to sell all capital goods of age s¯. In fact, convex adjustment costs make investments
continuous over time, and thus also over age since age and time go together. Therefore,
some of the capital goods of older age are still left. This is confirmed in the investment
graph of Figure 2, where we also see that I∗ (s¯) is negative.
If we leave out the effect that older capital goods are less costly, the effect of having
a shorter lifetime when capital goods get older remains, and steady state investments
decrease with age. This holds when we put
(6.10) q0 = q1 (s) = 0,
and, combining this with (6.4), (6.5), and (6.6), we obtain, when revenue is not specified,
that
K∗ (s) = ηw1 (s)(6.11)
=
ηα
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
e−µs − e−µse−(µ+λ)s¯ + 1
µ
(
1− e−µs))
− ηα
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
e−(µ+λ)s¯
1
2µ+ λ
(
e(µ+λ)s − e−µs)) .
In the specific case of a quadratic revenue function we get
(6.12)
K∗ (s) =
bw1 (s)
1 + 2ac1
=
b
((
e−µs − e−µse−(µ+λ)s¯ + 1
µ
(1− e−µs)− e−(µ+λ)s¯ 1
2µ+λ
(
e(µ+λ)s − e−µs)))
2β0(µ+λ)
α
+ 2aα
(
1−µ
µ2
(e−µs¯ − 1) + 2µ+λ−1
µ(2µ+λ)
e−(2µ+λ)s¯ + 1
µ
s¯− 1
(2µ+λ)(µ+λ)
+ 1−µ−λ
µ(µ+λ)
e−(µ+λ)s¯
) .
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Equilibrium distribution investments being decreasing with age, also result in a hump-
shaped structure of the steady state capital stock, like in Figure 1. The following proposi-
tion proves this analytically for a general revenue function, thus based on the equilibrium
distribution capital stock specified in (6.11).
Proposition 6.1. Consider the vintage capital stock model (2.1), (2.2), ((6.2)-(6.3)) with
purely quadratic investment costs, i.e. we have (6.10) that partly replaces (6.1). Then
equilibrium distribution capital stock K∗ (s) is positive for all s ∈ [0, s¯] , is increasing in
age for s ∈ [0, s∗] and decreasing in age for s ∈ [s∗, s¯] , where
(6.13) s∗ =
1
2µ+ λ
ln
(
2µ+ λ
µ+ λ
(
(1− µ) e(µ+λ)s¯ + µ
(
1− 1
2µ+ λ
)))
> 0.
Furthermore, it holds that
(6.14) K∗ (0) =
ηv
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
1− e−(µ+λ)s¯) > 0,
(6.15)
K∗ (s¯) =
ηα
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
−e−µs¯
(
−1 + 1
µ
)
+ e−µs¯e−(µ+λ)s¯
(
1
2µ+ λ
− 1
)
+
1
µ
− 1
2µ+ λ
)
> 0.
Proof. From (6.12) we obtain that
K∗′ (s) =
ηα
2β0 (µ+ λ)
e−µs
((
1− µ+ µ
(
1− 1
2µ+ λ
)
e−(µ+λ)s¯ − µ+ λ
2µ+ λ
e−(µ+λ)(s¯−s)eµs
))
,
from which it is straightforwardly concluded that K∗′ (s) > 0 for s < s∗, with s∗ given by
(6.13) and vice versa.
To check whether s∗ is positive we need to show that
2µ+ λ
µ+ λ
(
(1− µ) e(µ+λ)s¯ + µ
(
1− 1
2µ+ λ
))
> 1,
which holds because
2µ+ λ
µ+ λ
(
(1− µ) e(µ+λ)s¯ + µ
(
1− 1
2µ+ λ
))
>
2µ+ λ
µ+ λ
(
(1− µ) + µ
(
1− 1
2µ+ λ
))
= 1.
From (6.11) we straightforwardly obtain the expressions (6.14) and (6.15). To prove that
K∗ (s¯) > 0 we have to show that
−e−µs¯
(
−1 + 1
µ
)
+ e−µs¯e−(µ+λ)s¯
(
1
2µ+ λ
− 1
)
+
1
µ
− 1
2µ+ λ
> 0,
which is true since
−e−µs¯
(
−1 + 1
µ
)
+ e−µs¯e−(µ+λ)s¯
(
1
2µ+ λ
− 1
)
+
1
µ
− 1
2µ+ λ
> 1− 1
µ
+
1
2µ+ λ
− 1 + 1
µ
− 1
2µ+ λ
= 0.
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Figure 3. Capital stock in equilibrium distribution for every age s ∈ [0, s¯] for α = 12 with
remaining parameter values β0 = 0.5, µ = 0.2, λ = 0.1, s¯ = 10, q0 = 5, w = 0.25, b = 1, a =
0.00004.
Figure 4. Capital stock in equilibrium distribution for all ages s ∈ [0, s¯] for productivity
parameter α = 24 with remaining parameter values β0 = 0.5, µ = 0.2, λ = 0.1, s¯ = 10, q0 =
5, w = 0.25, b = 1, a = 0.00004.

As a final illustration of the interesting economic results that can be obtained, let us
focus on the impact of the productivity parameter α. Let us increase α from its original
value 3, as in (6.9), to α = 12. The resulting equilibrium distribution capital stock is
depicted in Figure 3. The equilibrium distribution capital stock is still hump-shaped,
as in the previous figures, but the difference is that the firm buys more capital goods.
Higher productivity makes investing in capital goods more worthwhile. If we increase the
productivity parameter α even further to α = 24, we obtain a equilibrium distribution
capital stock being depicted in Figure 4. Now the capital stock is smaller for all ages.
Concavity of the revenue function results in some bounded optimal quantity level, which,
due to the increased productivity, can be produced by less capital goods.
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The non-monotonic behavior of the capital stock that is obtained when productivity pa-
rameter α goes up, is an interesting result, from which an expected outcome of including
technological progress in the form of process innovation can be predicted. Increased pro-
ductivity first results in more investments, but when productivity increases even further,
investments go down because the optimal quantity in this market can be produced by less
capital stock. The latter feature is new, and was for instance not derived in Feichtinger
et al. (2006).
The non-monotonicity dependence of the equilibrium distribution capital stock on the pro-
ductivity parameter can also be analytically proved in the special case of purely quadratic
investment costs, as we do in the next proposition.
Proposition 6.2. In case of quadratic revenue (see (6.3)) and purely quadratic invest-
ment costs, the equilibrium distribution capital stock, K∗ (s) is increasing with the pro-
ductivity parameter α for α ∈ [0, αˆ] and decreasing with α for α ∈ [αˆ,∞), where
αˆ =
1
c1b
(√
c2 +
c1b2
2a
− c2
)
> 0,
in which
c1 =
1
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
1− µ
µ2
(
e−µs¯ − 1)+ 2µ+ λ− 1
µ (2µ+ λ)
e−(2µ+λ)s¯
)
(6.16)
+
1
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
s¯
µ
− 1
(2µ+ λ) (µ+ λ)
+
1− (µ+ λ)
µ (µ+ λ)
e−(µ+λ)s¯
)
,
(6.17) c2 =
q0
2β0 (µ− w)
(
µ− w − 1
µ
(
1− e−µs¯)+ 1
w
(
1− e−ws¯))
Proof. From (6.4)-(6.8), (6.16) and (6.17) we obtain that
∂K∗
∂α
=
∂
∂α
(
bα− 2ac2α2
1 + 2ac1α2
)
ϕ1 (s) ,
in which
ϕ1 (s) =
1
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
e−µs − e−µse−(µ+λ)s¯ + 1
µ
(
1− e−µs)− e−(µ+λ)s¯ 1
2µ+ λ
(
e(µ+λ)s − e−µs))
> 0.
It follows that
∂K∗
∂α
=
−2ac1bα2 − 4ac2α + b
(1 + 2ac1α2)
2 ϕ1 (s) .
Recognizing that the concave second order polynomial
−2ac1bα2 − 4ac2α + b
has a negative root and a positive root being equal to αˆ, gives the result of the proposition.

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Remark 6.3. Concerning the stability of the equilibrium distribution K∗, we observe
that Remark 5.12 applies here and may imply, depending on the value of the parameters,
that K∗ is locally, or even globally, stable.
6.2. Power Revenues. In this section we derive that the same result as that in Section
6.1, i.e. equilibrium distribution capital stock is hump-shaped in α, can be established
for an alternative revenue function based on the iso-elastic inverse demand function
p = bQ−
1
 ,
in which ε > 1 is the demand elasticity. Then the revenue function is
R (Q) = bQγ
with γ = 1− 1/. Since this revenue function has infinite derivative for Q = 0, it is not a
C1 function. Therefore, instead we employ the revenue function
(6.18) R (Q) = b ((θ +Q)γ − θ) ,
which approximates R (Q) = bQγ for θ small. We obtain from Lemma 5.10 (iii) that for
the revenue function as defined in (6.18) and the investment costs being purely quadratic,
which implies that c2 = 0, the η from (6.4) is implicitly determined by
(6.19) η (θ + ηc1)
1−γ − bγ = 0.
To establish the effect of the productivity parameter α on K∗ (s) in the case of iso-elastic
demand, we first determine how η depends on α. To do so, we first obtain from (6.7) that
c1 is a quadratic function of α :
c1 = fα
2
with
f =
1
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
1− µ
µ2
(
e−µs¯ − 1)+ 2µ+ λ− 1
µ (2µ+ λ)
e−(2µ+λ)s¯
)
+
1
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
1
µ
s¯− 1
(2µ+ λ) (µ+ λ)
+
1− (µ+ λ)
µ (µ+ λ)
e−(µ+λ)s¯
)
> 0.
This implies that we can rewrite (6.19) into
(6.20) η
(
θ + ηfα2
)1−γ − bγ = 0.
From the implicit function theorem we obtain that
∂η
∂α
= − 2 (1− γ) fηα
η (1− γ) + fα2η + θ < 0,
whereas we also conclude from (6.20) that
(6.21) lim
α→∞
η (α) = 0.
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Now we are ready to establish how K∗ (s) depends on α. From (6.5) and (6.11) we get
K∗ (s) = ηαϕ (s) ,
with
ϕ (s) =
1
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
(1− e−(µ+λ)s¯)e−µs + 1− e
−µs
µ
− e
−(µ+λ)s¯
2µ+ λ
(
e(µ+λ)s − e−µs)) > 0.
Hence, we obtain
∂K∗ (s)
∂α
= ϕ (s)
(
∂η
∂α
α + η
)
= ϕ (s) η
(
− 2 (1− γ) fα
2
η (1− γ) + fα2η + θ + 1
)
= ϕ (s) η
(
− 2 (1− γ) fη
α2
(1− γ) + fη + θ
α2
+ 1
)
.
Since η
α2
(1− γ) + fη + θ
α2
is decreasing in α, and, due to (6.21), it also holds that
− 2 (1− γ) fη
α2
(1− γ) + fη + θ
α2
+ 1 > 0 for α = 0,
− 2 (1− γ) fη
α2
(1− γ) + fη + θ
α2
+ 1 < 0 for α→∞,
we can conclude that we have proved the following proposition.
Proposition 6.4. In case of iso-elastic demand and purely quadratic investment costs, the
equilibrium distribution capital stock, K∗ (s), is increasing with the productivity parameter
α for α ∈ [0, αˆ], and decreasing with α for α ∈ [αˆ,∞), where αˆ is implicitly given by
− 2 (1− γ) fαˆ
2
η (αˆ) (1− γ) + fη (αˆ) + θ + 1 = 0,
with
f =
1
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
1− µ
µ2
(
e−µs¯ − 1)+ 2µ+ λ− 1
µ (2µ+ λ)
e−(2µ+λ)s¯ +
1
µ
s¯
)
− 1
2β0 (µ+ λ)
(
1
(2µ+ λ) (µ+ λ)
+
1− (µ+ λ)
µ (µ+ λ)
e−(µ+λ)s¯
)
> 0.
Remark 6.5. Concerning the stability of the equilibrium distribution K∗, we observe
that Lemma 5.11 applies here and may imply, depending on the value of the parameters,
that K∗ is locally, or even globally, stable.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Subsection 4.2
We here present a detailed description of the material in Subsection 4.2 as well as all the
proofs of the results there stated. Firstly we note that solutions of the ODEs in (4.6) have
to be intended in mild form. That is expressed in the following definitions.
Definition A.1. Let Assumptions 3.2 be satisfied. Let t ≥ 0 and let u ∈ Lpλ(t,+∞;U).
The mild solution of (3.1) is the function y ∈ L1loc(t,+∞;V ′) given by
(A.1) y(τ) = e(τ−t)Ax+
∫ τ
t
e(τ−σ)ABu(σ)dσ, τ ∈ [t,+∞[.
The mild solution of (4.4)-(4.5) is the function pi : [t,+∞[→ V given by
(A.2) pi(τ) =
∫ +∞
τ
e(A
∗
1−λ)(σ−τ)g′0(y(σ))dσ.
A mild solution to the closed loop equation (4.3) is a function y ∈ L1loc(t,+∞;V ′) satisfying
(A.3) y(τ) = e(τ−t)Ax+
∫ τ
t
e(τ−σ)AB(h∗0)
′(−B∗Ψ′(y(s)))dσ, τ ∈ [t,+∞[.
Lemma A.2. Let Assumption 3.2 hold, assume p ≥ 2, q = p
p−1 and λ > (2ω) ∨ ω. Let
also u ∈ Lpλ(t,+∞;U). Then:
(i) pi given by (A.2) is well defined and belongs to C0([t,+∞[;V );
(ii) if p > 2 and λ > 0, then pi ∈ Lqλ(t,+∞;V );
(iii) if p = 2 and λ > 0, then pi ∈ L2λ+ε(t,+∞;V ) ∩ L2(t, T ;V ), ∀ T < +∞, ε > 0;
(iv) if p = 2, λ > 0 and ω < 0, then pi ∈ L2λ(t,+∞;V ).
Proof. We first prove (i). Note that by assumptions on g′0, the integrand in (A.2) can be
estimated as follows
|e(A∗1−λ)(σ−τ)g′0(y(σ))|V ≤ |g′0|B1e−(λ−ω)(σ−τ)(1 + |y(σ)|V ′ ).
Since λ > ω, to prove the first assertion, i.e. that pi(·) is well defined, it is enough to show
that, for every τ ≥ t, the map σ 7→ e−(λ−ω)(σ−τ)|y(σ)|
V ′ is in L
1(τ,+∞).
By Assumption 3.2 (see also [44, Lemma 4.5]) one has
|y(σ)|
V ′ ≤ eω(σ−t)|x|V ′ +
∫ σ
t
eω(σ−r)‖B‖L(U,V ′)|u(r)|Udr
≤ Ceωσ
(
|x|
V ′ +
∫ σ
t
e−ωr|u(r)|Udr
)
≤ C1eωσ(1 + ρ(t, σ)
1
q )
(A.4)
for suitable constants C (depending only on t) and C1 (depending on t, x, and u), where
ρ(t, σ) =
{
|eq(λp−ω)t − eq(λp−ω)σ| λ 6= ωp
|t− σ| λ = ωp.
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Hence
e−(λ−ω)σ|y(σ)|
V ′ ≤ C1e−(λ−2ω)σ(1 + ρ(t, σ)
1
q ),
so that in the case λ 6= ωp one obtains
(A.5) e−(λ−2ω)σρ(t, σ)
1
q = |e−q(λ−2ω)σeq(λp−ω)t− e−(λ−qω)σ| 1q ≤ C2
[
e−(λ−2ω)σ ∨ e− 1q (λ−qω)σ
]
for a suitable constant C2, whereas in the case λ = ωp one has
(A.6) e−(λ−2ω)σρ(t, σ)
1
q = e−(λ−2ω)σ|t− σ| 1q .
Since λ > (2ω) ∨ ω then also λ > qω since q = p/(p− 1) ∈ (1, 2]. Hence, for each τ ≥ t,
the integrand in (A.2) is in L1(τ,+∞;V ).
The proof that pi ∈ C0([t,+∞);V ) follows from the dominated convergence theorem and
the fact that the above estimates does not depend on τ , when τ is taken in any bounded
interval.
Now we prove (ii). We start by showing that p > 2 implies pi ∈ Lqλ(t,+∞;V ). From the
estimates above, one has
|pi(τ)|V ≤ |g
′
0|B1
λ− ω +
|g′0|B1C1eωτ
λ− 2ω + |g
′
0|B1C1e(λ−ω)τ
∫ +∞
τ
e−(λ−2ω)σρ(t, σ)
1
q dσ
≡ γ1(τ) + γ2(τ) + γ3(τ).
(A.7)
The function γ1 is trivially in L
q
λ(t,+∞;R), since λ > 0. The function γ2 is in
Lqλ(t,+∞;R) since, as observed above, it must be λ > qω as q ∈ (1, 2]. Regard-
ing γ3, in the case λ = ωp, it must be necessarily ω > 0 (if not we cannot have
λ > ω). Let then δ > 0 such that λ > 2ω + 2δ. Since, by simple computations,
(σ − t)1/qe−δσ ≤ σ1/qe−δσ ≤ (qeδ)−1/q, we then have∫ +∞
τ
e−(λ−2ω)σ|t− σ| 1q dσ ≤ (qeδ)−1/q
∫ +∞
τ
e−(λ−2ω−δ)σdσ ≤ (qeδ)−1/q e
−(λ−2ω−δ)τ
λ− 2ω − δ
Hence, in this case, for a suitable constant C3 one has
(A.8) e−λτγ3(t)q ≤ C3e−λτeq(λ−ω)τe−q(λ−2ω−δ)τ = C3e−[λ−(ω+δ)q]τ ;
the last is an integrable function in [t,+∞) by the choice of δ. In the case λ 6= ωp, by
means of (A.5) one has
(A.9)
∫ +∞
τ
e−(λ−2ω)σρ(t, σ)
1
q dσ ≤ C2
∫ +∞
τ
[
e−(λ−2ω)σ ∨ e− 1q (λ−qω)σ
]
dσ.
By (A.7) we then have, for a suitable constant C4 > 0,
e−λτγ3(τ)q ≤ C4e−λτeq(λ−ω)τ
[
e−(λ−2ω)τ ∨ e− 1q (λ−qω)τ
]q
≤ C4
[
e−(λ−qω)τ ∨ e−λ(2−q)τ] ,(A.10)
which implies γ3 ∈ Lqλ(t,+∞;R) also in this case.
To prove (iii) it sufficies to observe that p = 2 then (A.8)-(A.10) computed with q = 2
and λ+ ε in place of λ imply promptly pi ∈ L2λ+ε(t,+∞;V ), ∀ε > 0.
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Finally we prove (iv). Let p = 2. Observe that, for τ ≥ t,
|pi(τ)|V =
∣∣∣∣∫ +∞
τ
e(A
∗
1−λ)(σ−τ)g′0(y(σ))dσ
∣∣∣∣
V
≤ |g′0|B1
∫ +∞
τ
e−(λ−ω)(σ−τ)(1 + |y(σ)|
V ′ )dσ.
which implies
e−λτ |pi(τ)|2V ≤ e−λτ2|g′0|2B1
[
1
(λ− ω)2 +
(∫ +∞
τ
e−(λ−ω)(σ−τ)|y(σ)|
V ′dσ
)2]
.
Since λ > 0, the first term is integrable on [t,+∞[. Concerning the second term we
exploit Jensen’s inequality to get
(A.11)
(∫ +∞
τ
e−(λ−ω)(σ−τ)|y(σ)|
V ′dσ
)2
≤ 1
λ− ω
∫ +∞
τ
e−(λ−ω)(σ−τ)|y(σ)|2
V ′
dσ
Hence
(A.12)∫ +∞
t
e−λτ |pi(τ)|2V dτ ≤
∫ +∞
t
e−λτ2|g′0|2B1
[
1
(λ− ω)2 +
1
λ− ω
∫ +∞
τ
e−(λ−ω)(σ−τ)|y(σ)|2
V ′
dσ
]
dτ.
The first term of the right hand side is 2|g′0|2B1e−λt/(λ − ω)2. To estimate the second we
use Fubini-Tonelli Theorem (see e.g. [36, Theorem 1.33]), recalling that the integrand
here is positive. Indeed∫ +∞
t
e−λτ
∫ +∞
τ
e−(λ−ω)(σ−τ)|y(σ)|2
V ′
dσdτ =
∫ +∞
t
|y(σ)|2
V ′
e−(λ−ω)σ
∫ σ
t
e−λτe(λ−ω)τdτdσ
=
∫ +∞
t
|y(σ)|2
V ′
e−(λ−ω)σ
e−ωt − e−ωσ
ω
dσ =: I0
where, in the last step, we use that ω 6= 0. To prove the claim it is now enough to prove
that the last integral I0 is finite. First of all, by (A.4), we have
(A.13) |y(σ)|2
V ′
≤ C5e2ωσ
[
1 +
(∫ σ
t
e−ωr|u(r)|U dr
)2]
for a suitable constant C5 (depending on t, x, and u). We apply again Jensen’s inequality
getting (∫ σ
t
e−ωr|u(r)|U dr
)2
≤ e
−ωt − e−ωσ
ω
∫ σ
t
e−ωr|u(r)|2U dr
Then we have
I0 ≤ C5
[∫ +∞
t
e−(λ−3ω)σ
e−ωt − e−ωσ
ω
dσ
+
∫ +∞
t
e−(λ−3ω)σ
(
e−ωt − e−ωσ
ω
)2 ∫ σ
t
e−ωr|u(r)|2U dr dσ
](A.14)
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Since λ > 0 and ω < 0 the first integral of the right hand side of (A.14) is finite, positive,
and, its value is
e−(λ−2ω)t
1
ω
[
1
λ− 3ω −
1
λ− 2ω
]
> 0.
Concerning the second integral of the right hand side of (A.14) (recalling that the inte-
grand is positive) we apply Fubini-Tonelli Theorem again, to get that it is equal to
I1 :=
∫ +∞
t
e−ωr|u(r)|2U
∫ +∞
r
e−(λ−3ω)σ
(
e−ωt − e−ωσ
ω
)2
dσdr
At this point we really need to use that ω < 08. This implies that the squared fraction
above is smaller than e−2ωσ/(ω2). Hence we have
I1 ≤ 1
ω2
∫ +∞
t
e−ωr|u(r)|2U
∫ +∞
r
e−(λ−ω)σdσdr ≤ 1
ω2(λ− ω)
∫ +∞
t
e−λr|u(r)|2U dr
Since u ∈ L2λ(t,+∞;U) the above imply the finiteness of I1 and, consequently, of I0,
which proves the claim. 
Theorem A.3. Let Assumption 3.2 hold, let p ≥ 2, q = p
p−1 and λ > (2ω) ∨ ω. Let also
u ∈ Lpλ(t,+∞;U). If pi ∈ W 1,1(t,+∞;V ) satisfies (4.4) almost everywhere in [t,+∞) and
the transversality condition (4.5), then pi is given by (A.2), that is pi is the mild solution
of (4.4)-(4.5).
Proof. By variation of constants formula, any pi satisfying (4.4) a.e. must also satisfy
(A.15) pi(τ) = e(A
∗
1−λ)(T−τ)pi(T ) +
∫ T
τ
e(A
∗
1−λ)(σ−τ)g′0(y(σ))dσ, ∀T > t, ∀τ ∈ [t, T ].
Note that (4.5) implies
lim
T→+∞
|e(A∗1−λ)(T−τ)pi(T )|V ≤ lim
T→+∞
e(ω−λ)(T−τ)|pi(T )|V = 0.
hence by passing to limits as T → +∞ in (A.15) one derives
pi(τ) = lim
T→+∞
∫ T
τ
e(A
∗
1−λ)(σ−τ)g′0(y(σ))dσ =
∫ +∞
τ
e(A
∗
1−λ)(σ−τ)g′0(y(σ))dσ
where the last equality follows from estimates (A.5)-(A.6). 
We are now ready to prove the Maximum Principle.
Proof of Theorem 4.5 (Maximum Principle)
Let K : Lpλ(t,+∞;U)→ R ∪ {+∞}, and G : Lpλ(t,+∞;U)→ R ∪ {+∞} be defined by
K(u) :=
∫ +∞
t
e−λτh0(u(τ))dτ, G(u) :=
∫ +∞
t
e−λτg0(y(τ ; t, x, u))dτ
8This was not needed up to now. Above we only used the fact that λ > 3ω and, to simplify computa-
tions, ω 6= 0.
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so that for all u ∈ dom(K) ∩ dom(G) we have
(A.16) J(u) = K(u) +G(u), and ∂J(u) ⊇ ∂K(u) + ∂G(u).
Claim 1: For u ∈ int dom(K) we have
∂K(u) = S, where
S ≡ {ϕ ∈ Lqλ(t,+∞;U) : ϕ(τ) ∈ ∂h0(u(τ)), for a.e. τ ∈ [t,+∞)}
(A.17)
Indeed
∂K(u) =
{
ϕ ∈ Lqλ(t,+∞;U) :∫ +∞
t
e−λτ
[
h0(w(τ))− h0(u(τ))− (ϕ(τ)|w(τ)− u(τ))U
]
dτ ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ Lpλ(t,+∞;U)
}
,
(A.18)
so that S ⊂ ∂K(u) is straightforward. To show the reverse inclusion, we let ϕ be any
fixed element of ∂K(u), E any measurable subset of [t,+∞), and we set, for any w ∈
Lpλ(t,+∞;U),
(A.19) w˜(τ) =
{
u(τ), τ 6∈ E
w(τ), τ ∈ E
Clearly we still have w˜ ∈ Lpλ(t,+∞;U), hence we derive∫
E
e−λτ
[
h0(w(τ))− h0(u(τ))− (ϕ(τ)|w(τ)− u(τ))U
]
dτ ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ Lpλ(t,+∞;U).
Since E and w where arbitrarily chosen, the above implies
h0(w(τ))− h0(u(τ))− (ϕ(τ)|w(τ)− u(τ))U ≥ 0, for a.e. τ ∈ [0,+∞)
that is, ϕ(τ) ∈ ∂h0(τ) for almost every τ ≥ 0.
Claim 2: Let (u, y) be admissible at (t, x). Assume that there exists pi ∈ Lqλ(t,+∞;V )
such that (pi, u, y) satisfies (4.6). Then (u, y) is optimal at (t, x).
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Let v be any control in dom(G). Then
G(v)−G(u) =
∫ +∞
t
[g0(y(τ ; v))− g0(y(τ ;u))] e−λτdτ
≥
∫ +∞
t
〈g′0(y(τ ;u)),
∫ τ
t
e(τ−σ)AB(v(σ)− u(σ))dσ〉e−λτdτ
=
∫ +∞
t
∫ +∞
σ
(
B∗e(τ−σ)A
∗
1g′0(y(τ ;u))
∣∣v(σ)− u(σ))
U
e−λτdτdσ
=
∫ +∞
t
( ∫ +∞
σ
B∗e(τ−σ)(A
∗
1−λ)g′0(y(τ ;u))dτ
∣∣v(σ)− u(σ))
U
e−λσdσ
=
∫ +∞
t
(
B∗pi(σ)
∣∣v(σ)− u(σ))
U
e−λσdσ
= 〈B∗pi, v − u〉Lqλ(t,+∞;U),Lpλ(t,+∞;U)
(A.20)
where we could exchange the order of integration since pi is in Lqλ(t,+∞;V ) by assumption.
Then we proved that
B∗pi ∈ ∂G(u).
Now, by (4.6) we also know that −B∗pi(σ) ∈ ∂h0(u(σ)) almost everywhere in [t,+∞[;
hence, by Claim 1, we get −B∗pi ∈ ∂K(u). By (A.16) it follows that ∂J(u) 3 0, that is,
u is optimal and (i) is proved.
Claim 3. Assume that, either p > 2 and λ > 0, or p = 2, λ > 0 and ω < 0. Assume
that (u∗, y∗) is optimal at (t, x), and let pi∗ be the associated solution of (A.2). Then G
is Gaˆteaux differentiable in u∗ with G′(u∗) = B∗pi∗. Consequently ∂J(u∗) = B∗pi∗ + S.
First of all we recall that, by assumption and by Lemma A.2, we have pi∗ ∈ Lqλ(t,+∞;V ).
Moreover, for any fixed v in Lpλ(t,+∞;U), and any  > 0, there exists 0 < 0 ≤  such
that
G(u∗ + v)−G(u∗)

=
∫ +∞
t
g0(y(τ ;u
∗ + v))− g0(y∗(τ))

e−λτdτ =
=
∫ +∞
t
〈g′0(y(τ ;u∗ + 0v)), y(τ ;u∗ + 0v)− y∗(τ)〉 e−λτdτ
=
∫ +∞
t
〈
g′0(y(τ ;u
∗ + 0v)),
∫ τ
t
e(τ−σ)ABv(σ)dσ
〉
e−λτdτ
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Hence, arguing as in (A.20) to rewrite the term 〈B∗pi∗, v〉Lqλ,Lpλ , we get∣∣∣∣G(u∗ + v)−G(u∗) − 〈B∗pi∗, v〉Lqλ,Lpλ
∣∣∣∣ =
=
∣∣∣∣∫ +∞
t
g0(y(τ ;u
∗ + v))− g0(y∗(τ))

e−λτdτ − 〈B∗pi∗, v〉Lqλ,Lpλ
∣∣∣∣ =
=
∣∣∣∣∫ +∞
t
〈g′0(y(τ ;u∗ + 0v))− g′0(y∗(τ)),
∫ τ
t
e(τ−σ)ABv(σ)dσ〉e−λτdτ
∣∣∣∣
≤ [g′0]0
∫ +∞
t
∣∣∣∣∫ τ
t
e(τ−σ)ABv(σ)dσ
∣∣∣∣2
V ′
e−λτdτ =: I
We estimate now the right hand side in the case when p > 2 and λ 6= ωp. By Ho¨lder
inequality one has∣∣∣∣∫ τ
t
e(τ−σ)ABv(σ)dσ
∣∣∣∣
V ′
≤ eωτ
[∫ τ
t
e(
λ
p
−ω)qσdσ
] 1
q
‖B‖L(U,V ′)|v|Lpλ(t,+∞;U)
= eωτ
∣∣∣∣∣∣e
(λp−ω)qτ − e(λp−ω)qt
q
(
λ
p
− ω
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
q
‖B‖L(U,V ′)|v|Lpλ(t,+∞;U)
Then, for a suitable constant C5, depending on g, B and v, we have
I ≤ [g′0]0
∫ +∞
t
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣eωτ
∣∣∣∣∣∣e
(λp−ω)qτ − e(λp−ω)qt
q
(
λ
p
− ω
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
q
‖B‖L(U,V ′)|v|Lpλ(t,+∞;U)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
e−λτdτ
≤ C50
∫ +∞
t
∣∣∣e(λp−ω)qτ − e(λp−ω)qt∣∣∣ 2q e−(λ−2ω)τdτ
≤ C50
∫ +∞
t
(
e(
λ
p
−ω)qτ ∨ 1
) 2
q
e−(λ−2ω)τdτ
= C50
∫ +∞
t
eλ(
2
p
−1)τ ∨ e−(λ−2ω)τdτ.
(A.21)
Since p > 2 ⇒ λ
(
2
p
− 1
)
< 0, then one may let  → 0 and obtains that the right hand
side in (A.21) goes to 0.
Let now p > 2 and λ = ωp. By Ho¨lder inequality one has∣∣∣∣∫ τ
t
e(τ−σ)ABv(σ)dσ
∣∣∣∣
V ′
≤ ‖B‖L(U,V ′)eωτ
∫ τ
t
e−
λ
p
σ|v(σ)|Udσ
≤ ‖B‖L(U,V ′)eωτ |τ − t|
1
q |v|Lpλ(t,+∞;U)
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Then, for suitable C6 > 0 we get
I ≤ [g′0]0
∫ +∞
t
∣∣∣‖B‖L(U,V ′)eωτ |τ − t| 1q |v|Lpλ(t,+∞;U)∣∣∣ v2e−λτdτ
≤ C60
∫ +∞
t
|τ − t| 2q e−(λ−2ω)τdτ
and by letting → 0 the right hand side goes to 0.
Let now p = 2, λ > 0 and ω < 0. Then we have∣∣∣∣∫ τ
t
e(τ−σ)ABv(σ)dσ
∣∣∣∣2
V ′
≤ ‖B‖2L(U,V ′)
[∫ τ
t
eω(τ−σ)|v(σ)|dσ
]2
≤ ‖B‖2L(U,V ′)
1
ω
[
eω(τ−t) − 1] ∫ τ
t
eω(τ−σ)|v(σ)|2dσ
where in the last step we used the Jensen’s inequality. Hence, by using Fubini-Tonelli
Theorem, we get∫ +∞
t
∣∣∣∣∫ τ
t
e(τ−σ)ABv(σ)dσ
∣∣∣∣2
V ′
e−λτdτ ≤
≤ ‖B‖2L(U,V ′)
∫ +∞
t
1
ω
[
eω(τ−t) − 1] e−λτ ∫ τ
t
eω(τ−σ)|v(σ)|2dσdτ =
= ‖B‖2L(U,V ′)e−λt
∫ +∞
t
eω(σ−t)|v(σ)|2
∫ +∞
σ
1
ω
[
eω(τ−t) − 1] e−(λ−ω)(τ−t)dτdσ =
= ‖B‖2L(U,V ′)e−λt
∫ +∞
t
|v(σ)|2 1
ω
[
e−(λ−ω)(σ−t)
λ− 2ω −
e−λ(σ−t)
λ− ω
]
dσ ≤
≤ ‖B‖2L(U,V ′)
1
(−ω)(λ− ω)
∫ +∞
t
|v(σ)|2e−λσdσ
where, in the last inequality, we used that ω < 0. This immediately implies that
I ≤ [g′0]0‖B‖2L(U,V ′)
1
(−ω)(λ− ω) |v|L2λ(t,+∞;U)
which immediately gives the claim.
Claim 4. Assume that, either p > 2 and λ > 0, or p = 2, λ > 0 and ω < 0. Assume
that (u∗, y∗) is optimal at (t, x), and let pi∗ be the associated solution of (A.2). Then
(pi∗, u∗, y∗) is a mild solution of (4.6).
We only need to prove that the last line of (4.6). From optimality of u∗ we have ∂J(u∗) 3 0.
Then Claim 1 and Claim 3 imply (4.7) and Claim 4 follows.
2
Proof of Theorem 4.6 Firstly we prove that pi∗(t; t, x) ∈ ∂Z0(x). We recall that in
Theorem 4.5 we showed that −B∗pi∗(τ ; t, x) ∈ ∂h0(u∗(τ)) almost everywhere in [0,+∞).
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Then, for all x¯ ∈ V ′, and an associated control u¯, optimal at (t, x¯), we have
Z0(x¯)− Z0(x) = eλt [J(t, x¯, u¯)− J(t, x, u∗)]
≥
∫ +∞
t
[
〈g′0(y∗(τ)), y¯(τ)− y∗(τ)〉 − (B∗pi∗(τ ; t, x))|u¯(τ)− u∗(τ))U
]
e−λ(τ−t)dτ.
Note that
∫ +∞
t
〈g′0(y∗(τ)), y¯(τ)− y∗(τ)〉V,V ′ e−λ(τ−t)dτ =
=
∫ +∞
t
〈
g′0(y
∗(τ)), eA(τ−t)(x¯− x) +
∫ τ
t
eA(τ−σ)B(u¯(σ)− u∗(σ))dσ
〉
e−λ(τ−t)dτ =
=
∫ +∞
t
〈
e(A
∗
1−λ)(τ−t)g′0(y
∗(τ)), x¯− x〉 dτ+
+
∫ +∞
t
∫ τ
t
〈
g′0(y
∗(τ)), eA(τ−σ) (B(u¯(σ)− u∗(σ))〉 e−λ(τ−t)dσdτ.
The last term can be rewritten exchanging the integrals as
∫ +∞
t
∫ +∞
σ
(
B∗e(A
∗
1−λ)(τ−σ)g′0(y
∗(τ))|u¯(σ)− u∗(σ))
U
e−λ(σ−t)dτdσ =
=
∫ +∞
t
(B∗pi∗(σ; t, x)|u¯(σ)− u∗(σ))U e−λ(σ−t)dσ.
Hence we get
Z0(x¯)− Z0(x) ≥
〈∫ +∞
t
e(A
∗
1−λ)(τ−t)g′0(y
∗(τ))dτ, x¯− x
〉
= 〈pi∗(t; t, x), x¯− x〉,
and the assertion is proven. The proof that pi∗(τ ; τ, y∗(τ)) ∈ ∂Z0(y∗(τ)) for every τ ≥ t is
standard but we write it here for the sake of completeness. Let τ > t and observe that,
by the dynamic programming principle, the control defined by
u0,y∗(τ)(σ) ≡ u∗(σ + τ)
is optimal at (0, y∗(τ)). Consequently the associated trajectory satisfies
y(σ; 0, y∗(τ), u0,y∗(τ)) = y(σ + τ ; τ, y∗(τ), u∗) = y∗(σ + τ).
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Then by the first part of the proof we have
∂Z0(y
∗(τ)) 3 pi∗(0; 0, y∗(τ)) =
=
∫ +∞
0
e(A
∗
1−λ)σg′0(y(r; 0, y
∗(τ), u0,y∗(τ)))dσ
=
∫ +∞
0
e(A
∗
1−λ)σg′0(y
∗(σ + τ))dσ
=
∫ +∞
τ
e(A
∗
1−λ)(r−τ)g′0(y
∗(r))dr
= pi∗(τ ; τ, y∗(τ))
which gives the claim. It finally suffices to note that, when p > 2, one has by Theorem
4.2, that Z0 = Ψ and ∂Ψ(x) = {Ψ′(x)} to complete the proof. 2
Appendix B. Proofs of Subsection 4.3
We here work out the proofs of the results stated in Subsection 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 4.10. We first prove (i). Assume (x¯, p¯i, u¯) is a MP-equilibrium point
for problem (P). Since λ > ω, then λ ∈ ρ(A∗1), and the second of (4.11) applies, implying
(B.1) p¯i = (λ− A∗1)−1g′0(x¯).
Then, plugging (B.1) into the third equation of (4.9) and then u¯ so obtained into the first,
we derive (4.13). Moreover, using (B.1) in Theorem 4.6, we get (4.14).
We now prove (ii). We consider a CLE-equilibrium point xˆ and set uˆ := (h∗0)
′(−B∗Ψ′0(xˆ)).
By Theorem 4.3 and Remark 4.4 we know that the couple (xˆ, uˆ) is optimal.
By Theorem 4.5-(ii) we can associate, to such optimal couple, a costate pˆi which is the
(mild) solution of the costate equation in (4.6). Such mild solution is then necessarily
stationary (see Definition A.1) and, since λ > ω, given by
pˆi ≡ (λ− A∗0)−1g′0(xˆ).
Moreover, by Theorem 4.6 it is also true that pˆi = Ψ′(xˆ). As a consequence, (xˆ, pˆi, uˆ)
solves (4.9) and is then a MP-equilibrium point. 2
Before demonstrating Lemma 4.11 we need to state and prove the following result.
Proposition B.1. Assume that 0 ∈ ρ(A∗1) (that is, (A∗1)−1 is well defined and bounded in
H). Then A−1 has bounded inverse on V ′, defined by the position
〈A−1f, ϕ〉 = 〈f, (A∗1)−1ϕ〉, for all f ∈ V ′ and ϕ ∈ V.
Moreover
‖A−1‖L(V ′) ≤ ‖(A∗1)−1‖L(H).
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Proof. For all f ∈ V ′ and ϕ ∈ V we have
|〈A−1f, ϕ〉| = |〈f, (A∗1)−1ϕ〉|
≤ |f |
V ′ |(A∗1)−1ϕ|V
= |f |
V ′ (|(A∗1)−1ϕ|H + |A∗1(A∗1)−1ϕ|H)
= |f |
V ′ (|(A∗1)−1ϕ|H + |(A∗1)−1A∗1ϕ|H)
≤ |f |
V ′‖(A∗1)−1‖L(H)|ϕ|V
(B.2)

Proof of Lemma 4.11.
Define T : V ′ → V ′ as as in (4.16). By its definition, T satisfies
|Tx− Ty|
V ′ ≤ ‖(A)−1‖L(V ′)‖B‖2L(U,V ′)[(h∗0)′][g′0]
1
λ− ω |x− y|V ′ .(B.3)
implying the claim. Since T (V ′) ⊆ D(A), then fixed points of T lie in D(A). 2
Proof of Proposition 4.16 Let x ∈ I(x¯) and let x∗(t) be the associated optimal trajec-
tory, i.e. the solution of the closed loop equation
(B.4)
{
y′(t) = Ay(t) + f(y(t)), t > 0
y(0) = x,
Let xn ∈ I(x¯)∩D(A) be such that xn → x in V ′ as n→ +∞. Let y∗n(t) be the associated
optimal trajectory. Since y∗n is continuous, then it must remain in I(x¯) at least for a
sufficiently small t. For such t we must have (recall that y∗n(t) ∈ D(A) by assumption)
1
2
d
dt
|y∗n(t)− x¯|2V ′ =
(
(y∗n(t))
′|y∗n(t)− x¯
)
V ′
=
(
A(y∗n(t)− x¯) + f(y∗n(t))− f(x¯)|y∗n(t)− x¯
)
V ′ ≤ ξ|y∗n(t)− x¯|2V ′ .
This implies that
(B.5) |y∗n(t)− x¯|2V ′ ≤ e2ξt|xn − x¯|2V ′
Next we take the limits as n→ +∞. Note that zn(t) := y∗n(t)− x∗(t) solves
(B.6)
{
z′n(t) = Azn(t) + f(y
∗
n(t))− f(x∗(t)), t > 0
z(0) = xn − x.
By Theorem 4.3 f is Lipschitz continuous so with Lipschitz constant [f ]0,1, a standard
Gronwall inequality implies
|y∗n(t)− x∗(t)|V ′ ≤ |xn − x|V ′e(ω+[f ]0,1)t,
hence |y∗n(t)− x∗(t)|V ′ converges to 0 for every t ≥ 0. Consequently, from (B.5) one has
|x∗(t)− x¯|2V ′ ≤ e2ξt|x− x¯|2V ′ , for every t ≥ 0,
implying the claims. 2
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Proof of Corollary 4.17. It is enough to check that (4.18) is verified, either in I, or
in V ′. If f is Lipschitz continuous on I (in the topology of V ′), with Lipschitz constant
θ¯ < θ then we have
(f(x)− f(x¯)|x− x¯)V ′ ≤ θ¯|x− x¯|2V ′ , ∀x ∈ I.
This immediately implies that (4.18) holds in I with ξ = θ¯ − θ.
Similarly, if f is globally Lipschitz continuous in V ′, we get that (4.18) is verified in the
whole V ′.
2
Appendix C. Proofs of Section 5
Proof of Lemma 5.4. Note that if A∗0 and A are the operators described in Section 3.3,
then the following two facts hold true. First, by definition of A∗0, we have α¯ = (λ−A∗0)−1α.
Second, A is invertible, so that equation (4.13) may be rewritten as Tx = x by means of
the operator T defined in (4.16). Now (3.9) holds, so that one has
g′0(x) = −R′(〈α, x〉)α, and (λ− A∗0)−1g′0(x) = −R′(〈α, x〉)α
Moreover, since h0(u) = C(u0, u1) = C0(u0) + C1(u1), then the convex conjugate C
∗ of
C is also of type C∗(u0, u1) = C∗0(u0) + C
∗
1(u1). Then, recalling the definition of B,B
∗
in Section 2, and by means of (5.5), the operator T defined in (4.16) can be rewritten as
follows:
Tx = −A−1B(C∗)′ (B∗R′(〈α, x〉)α)
= −A−1B(C∗)′ (R′(〈α, x〉)α(0), R′(〈α, x〉)α)
= −A−1B ((C∗0)′ (R′(〈α, x〉)α(0)) , (C∗1)′ (R′(〈α, x〉)α))
= −A−1 [(C∗0)′ (R′(〈α, x〉)α(0)) δ0 + (C∗1)′ (R′(〈α, x〉)α)]
= (C∗0)
′ (R′(〈α, x〉)α(0)) [−A−1δ0] + [−A−1] (C∗1)′ (R′(〈α, x〉)α)
which by (3.7) implies (5.6). By Theorem 4.10 we derive the remaining statements. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.5. Set η : V ′ → R, η(x) = R′(〈α, x〉) and note that, by (5.6), we
get Tx(s) = F (η(x))(s). Then the equation Tx = x is rewritten as
F (η(x))[s] = x(s), ∀s ∈ [0, s¯].
Applying η on both sides of such equation we get
R′(〈α, F (η(x))〉) = η(x).
Hence, if x¯ is a solution of Tx = x, then η(x¯) is a solution of (5.10). Viceversa, let η¯
be a solution to (5.10). Then, substituting into (5.8) and (5.6), we get that F (η¯) solves
F (η¯) = TF (η¯), so F (η¯) solves Tx = x. 2
Proof of Theorem 5.11. Note that when the value function V0 is differentiable, then
Proposition 4.15 applies with Ψ = −V0. Indeed by Lemma 3.5 and the Lumer-Philips
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Theorem (see e.g. [68, Theorem 1.4.3]), the operator A is dissipative in V ′ with (Ax|x)V ′ ≤
−µ|x|2V ′ , and the function f defined in Proposition 4.15 can be rewritten by means of (3.6)
(5.12) as
f(x) = −B
(
1
4β0
(Ψ′(x)[0]− q0) , 1
4β1 (·) (Ψ
′(x)− q1)
)
= −〈δ0,Ψ
′(x)〉 − q0
4β0
δ0 − 1
4β1 (·) (Ψ
′(x)− q1) .
Hence, if x¯ is a CLE-equilibrium point, for all x ∈ V ′, we have
(f(x)− f(x¯)|x− x¯)V ′ = −
〈δ0,Ψ′(x)−Ψ′(x¯)〉
4β0
(δ0|x−x¯)V ′−
(
1
4β1 (·) (Ψ
′(x)−Ψ′(x¯))
∣∣∣∣x− x¯)
V ′
.
Note that the second term in the above inequality satisfies(
1
4β1 (·) (Ψ
′(x)−Ψ′(x¯))
∣∣∣∣x− x¯)
V ′
≥ 1
4|β1|L∞(0,s¯) (Ψ
′(x)−Ψ′(x¯)|x− x¯)V ′ ≥ 0
since β1 ∈ L∞(0, s¯), and Ψ′ is a monotone operator (as a consequence of the convexity of
Ψ). That in particular implies
(C.1) (f(x)− f(x¯)|x− x¯)V ′ ≤ −
〈δ0,Ψ′(x)−Ψ′(x¯)〉
4β0
(δ0|x− x¯)V ′ ≤ [Ψ]L|δ0|
2
V ′
4β0
|x− x¯|2V ′ ,
so that (4.18) is satisfied with ξ = −µ+ [Ψ]L|δ0|2V ′/(4β0). 2
References
[1] P. Acquistapace, F. Flandoli, and B. Terreni, Initial boundary value problems and optimal control
for nonautonomous parabolic systems, SIAM J. Control Optimiz, 29 (1991), 89–118.
[2] P. Acquistapace, B. Terreni, Infinite horizon LQR problems for nonautonomous parabolic systems
with boundary control, SIAM J. Control Optimiz, 34 (1996), 1–30.
[3] P. Acquistapace, B. Terreni, Classical solutions of nonautonomuos Riccati equations arising in par-
abolic boundary control problems, Appl. Math. Optim., 39 (1999), 361–409.
[4] P. Acquistapace, B. Terreni, Classical solutions of nonautonomuos Riccati equations arising in Par-
abolic Boundary Control problems II, Appl. Math. Optim., 41 (2000), 199–226.
[5] Asea P, Zak P (1999) Time-to-build and cycles. Journal of economic dynamics and control 23(8):1155-
1175.
[6] Bambi M (2008) Endogenous growth and time-to-build: The AK case. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control 32(4):1015-1040.
[7] Bambi M., Fabbri, G., Gozzi, F., (2012) Optimal policy and consumption smoothing effects in the
time-to-build AK model. ECONOMIC THEORY, 50 (3), p. 635-669.
[8] Barbu, V., Boundary control problems with convex cost criterion, SIAMJ. Control and Optim.,
18(1980), 227-254.
[9] V. Barbu, G. Da Prato, “Hamilton–Jacobi Equations in Hilbert Spaces,” Pitman, London, 1983.
[10] V. Barbu, G. Da Prato, Hamilton-Jacobi equations in Hilbert spaces; variational and semigroup
approach, Ann. Mat. Pura Appl., IV, 42 (1985), 303-349.
[11] V. Barbu, G. Da Prato, A note on a Hamilton-Jacobi equation in Hilbert space, Nonlinear Anal., 9
(1985), 1337–1345.
48 S. Faggian, F. Gozzi, P.Kort
[12] V. Barbu, G. Da Prato and C. Popa, Existence and uniqueness of the dynamic programming equation
in Hilbert spaces, Nonlinear Anal., n. 3, 7 (1983), 283-299.
[13] V. Barbu, Th. Precupanu, “Convexity and Optimization in Banach Spaces,” Editura Academiei,
Bucharest, 1986.
[14] E. Barucci, F. Gozzi, Investment in a Vintage Capital Model, Research in Economics, Vol 52,
pp.159–188, 1998.
[15] E. Barucci, F. Gozzi, Technology Adpotion and Accumulation in a Vintage Capital Model, J. of
Economics, Vol. 74, no. 1, pp.1–30, 2001.
[16] Benhabib, J., Rustichini, A., 1991, Vintage capital, investment, and growth, Journal of Economic
Theory, 55, 323-339.
[17] A. Bensoussan, G. Da Prato, M.C. Delfour, S.K. Mitter, “Representation and Control of Infinite
Dimensional Systems,” Vol. 1 & 2, Birka¨user, Boston, 1993.
[18] Boucekkine, R., Camacho, C., and Fabbri, G. (2013). Spatial dynamics and convergence: The spatial
AK model. Journal of Economic Theory, 148(6), 2719-2736.
[19] Boucekkine, R., Fabbri, G., Federico, S., Gozzi, F., (2018). Growth and Agglomeration in the Het-
erogeneous Space: A Generalized AK Approach. 2017. ¡halshs-01399995v2¿.
[20] Boucekkine, R., Licandro, O., Christopher, P., 1997, Differential-difference equations in economics:
on the numerical solution of vintage capital growth models, Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 21, 347-362.
[21] Boucekkine, R., Germain, M., Licandro, O., Magnus, A., 1998, Creative destruction, investment
volatility, and the average age of capital, Journal of Economic Growth, 3 , 361-384.
[22] Boucekkine, R., del Rio, F., Licandro, O., 1999, Endogenous vs. exogenously driven fluctuations in
vintage capital models, Journal of Economic Theory, 88, 161-187.
[23] Boucekkine, R., Germain, M, Licandro, O., Magnus, A., 2001, Numerical solution by iterative meth-
ods of a class of vintage capital models, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 25, 655-669.
[24] P. Cannarsa, G. Di Blasio, A direct approach to infinite dimensional Hamilton–Jacobi equations and
applications to convex control with state constraints, Diff. Int. Eq., 8 (1995), no. 2, 225–246.
[25] P. Cannarsa, F. Gozzi, H.M. Soner, A dynamic programming approach to nonlinear boundary control
problems of parabolic type. J. Funct. Anal. 117 (1993), no. 1, 25–61.
[26] P. Cannarsa, M.E. Tessitore, Infinite dimensional Hamilton–Jacobi equations and Dirichlet boundary
control problems of parabolic type, SIAM J. Control Optim., 34 (1996), 1831–1847.
[27] CannarsaTessitore94
[28] M.G. Crandall, P.L. Lions, Hamilton–Jacobi equations in infinite dimensions. Part I: Uniqueness of
viscosity solutions, J. Funct. Anal., 62 (1985), 379–396;
Part II: Existence of viscosity solutions, J. Funct. Anal., 65 (1986), 368–405;
Part III, J. Funct. Anal., 68 (1986), 214–247;
Part IV: Hamiltonians with unbounded linear terms, J. Funct. Anal., 90 (1990), 237–283;
Part V: Unbounded linear terms and B–continuous solutions, J. Funct. Anal., 97, 2, (1991), 417–465;
Part VI: Nonlinear A and Tataru’s method refined, Evolution equations, control theory, and bio-
mathematics, Han sur Lesse, (1991), 51-89, Lecture Notes in Pure and Appl. Math., 155, Dekker,
New York, 1994;
Part VII: The HJB equation is not always satisfied, J. Func. Anal., 125 (1994), 111–148.
[29] Davidson, R., Harris, R., 1981, Non-convexities in continuous-time investment theory, Review of
Economic Studies, 48. 235-253.
[30] G. Di Blasio, Global solutions for a class of Hamilton-Jacobi equations in Hilbert spaces, Numer.
Funct. Anal. Optim., 8 (1985/86), no. 3-4, 261–300.
Equilibrium Distributions for Optimal Investment 49
[31] G. Di Blasio, Optimal control with infinite horizon for distributed parameter systems with constrained
controls, SIAM J. Control & Optim., 29 (1991); no. 4, 909-925.
[32] Eisner, R., Strotz, R.H., 1963, Determinants of business investment, in Impacts of Monetary Policy,
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, USA, 60-223.
[33] Engel, K.; Nagel, R., One-parameter semigroups for linear evolution equations Graduate Texts in
Mathematics, 194, Springer-Verlag, New York, 2000.
[34] Fabbri, G. (2016). Geographical structure and convergence: A note on geometry in spatial growth
models. Journal of Economic Theory, 162(1), 114-136.
[35] Fabbri, G., Gozzi, F., Solving optimal growth models with vintage capital: The dynamic programming
approach, J. Econ. Theory (2008), vol. 143 , 1, pp. 331-373.
[36] Fabbri, G., Gozzi, F., Swiech, A., Stochastic Optimal Control in Infinite Dimension, Springer, 2017.
[37] G. Fabbri; S. Faggian; G. Freni, On the Mitra-Wan Forest Management Problem in Continuous
Time, J. Econ. Theory (2015), vol. 157, pp. 1001-1040
[38] S. Faggian, Boudary control problems with convex cost and Dynamic Programming in infinite dimen-
sion. Part 1: the maximum principle, Diff. and Int. Eq., Vol. 17 (2004), n.9-10, pp. 1149–1174.
[39] S. Faggian, Boudary control problems with convex cost and Dynamic Programming in infinite dimen-
sion. Part 2: the HJB equation, Discrete Contin. Dyn. Syst., 12 (2005), n.2 pp. 323–346.
[40] S. Faggian, Regular solutions of Hamilton–Jacobi equations arising in Economics, Appl. Math. Op-
tim., Vol. 51, (2005), n. 2, pp. 123–162.
[41] S. Faggian, Applications of dynamic programming to economic problems with vintage capital, Dy-
namics of Continuous, Discrete and Impulsive Systems Series A: Mathematical Analysis (2008), 15
(4).
[42] S. Faggian, Hamilton–Jacobi equations arising from boundary control problems with state constraints,
SIAM J Control Optim., vol. 47, pp. 2157-217
[43] S. Faggian, F. Gozzi On the dynamic programming approach for optimal control problems of PDE’s
with age structure, Math. Pop Stud., Vol 11, n. 3–4, 2004, pp.233–270.
[44] S. Faggian, F. Gozzi, Optimal investment models with vintage capital: a Dynamic programming
approach, J. Math. Econ. (2010).
[45] Fattorini, H. O., Boundary control systems. SIAM J. Control, 6, 1968, pp. 349385.
[46] , Fattorini87
[47] G. Feichtinger, R. Hartl, and S. Sethi. Dynamical Optimal Control Models in Advertising: Recent
Developments. Management Sci., 40:195226, 1994.
[48] G. Feichtinger, G. Tragler, and V.M. Veliov, Optimality Conditions for Age–Structured Control
Systems, J. Math. Anal. Appl. 288(1), 47-68, 2003.
[49] G. Feichtinger, R.F. Hartl, P.M. Kort, and V.M. Veliov, Dynamic investment behavior taking into
account ageing of the capital goods, Dynamical systems and control, 379–391, Stability Control
Theory Methods Appl., 22, Chapman & Hall/CRC, Boca Raton, FL, 2004.
[50] G. Feichtinger, R.F. Hartl, P.M. Kort, and V.M. Veliov. Anticipation Effects of Technological Progress
on Capital Accumulation: a Vintage Capital Approach, J. Econom. Theory 126 (2006), no. 1, 143–
164.
[51] F. Gozzi, Some results for an optimal control problem with a semilinear state equation I, Rendiconti
dell’Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, n. 8, 82 (1988), 423-429.
[52] F. Gozzi, Some results for an optimal control problem with a semilinear state equation II, Siam J.
Control and Optim., n. 4, 29 (1991), 751-768.
[53] F. Gozzi, Some results for an infinite horizon control problem governed by a semilinear state equation,
Proceedings Vorau, July 10-16 1988; editors F.Kappel, K.Kunisch, W.Schappacher; International
Series of Numerical Mathematics, Vol. 91, Birka¨user - Verlag, Basel, 1989, 145-163.
50 S. Faggian, F. Gozzi, P.Kort
[54] F. Gozzi, A. Swiech, X.Y. Zhou, A corrected proof of the stochastic verification theorem within the
framework of viscosity solutions, Siam J. Control and Optim., 43 (2005), no. 6, 2009–2019.
[55] Gozzi, F.; Tessitore, M. E., Sufficient conditions for Dirichlet boundary control problems of parabolic
type, Partial differential equation methods in control and shape analysis (Pisa), 189204, Lecture
Notes in Pure and Appl. Math., 188, Dekker, New York, 1997.
[56] . Gozzi, F.; Tessitore, M. E., Optimality conditions for Dirichlet boundary control problems of
parabolic type J. Math. Systems Estim. Control 8 (1998), no. 1.
[57] Greenwood, J., Jovanovic, B., 2001, Accounting for growth, Studies in Income and Wealth: New
Directions in Productivity Analysis, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA.
[58] Iftode, V. Hamilton-Jacobi equations an dboundar yconvex control problems, Rev. Roumain eMath.
Pures Appl., 34(2), (1989), 117-127.
[59] Kato, N., A principle of linearized stability for nonlinear evolution equations, Transactions of the
American Mathematical society, 347 (1995), pp.2851-2868.
[60] I. Lasiecka, R. Triggiani, “Control Theory for Partial Differential Equations: Continuous and Ap-
proximation Theory,” Vol I. Abstract parabolic systems. Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Ap-
plications, 74. Vol II. Abstract hyperbolic-like systems over a finite time horizon; Encyclopedia of
Mathematics and its Applications; CambridgeUniversity Press: Cambridge, 2000, 74-75.
[61] I. Lasiecka and R. Triggiani. Dfferential and algebraic equations with application to boundary control
problems: Continuous theory and approximation theory, Lecture Notes in Control and Information
Sciences. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1991,p. 164.
[62] Lions, J.-L., Optimal control of systems governed by partial differential equations. Translated
from the French by S. K. Mitter. Die Grundlehren der mathematischen Wissenschaften, Band 170
Springer-Verlag, New York-Berlin 1971.
[63] X.Y. Li, J.M. Yong Optimal Control Theory for Infinite Dimensional Systems, Birkhauser, Boston,
Cambridge, MA, 1995.
[64] Lunardi, A., Analytic Semigroups, Optimal Regularity and Parabolic Problems, Birkhauser, Boston,
Cambridge, MA, 1995.
[65] Malcomson, J.M., 1975, Replacement and the rental value of capital equipment subject to obsoles-
cence, Journal of Economic Theory, 10, 24-41.
[66] C. Marinelli, Optimal advertising under uncertainty, PHD thesis, Columbia University, 2003.
[67] Moll, B., Nuno, G., Social optima in economies with heterogeneous agents, Review of Economic
Dynamics 28 (2018), 150180.
[68] Pazy, A. Semigroups of linear operators and applications to partial differential equations. Applied
Mathematical Sciences, 44. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1983.
[69] Solow, R., Tobin, J., Von Weiszacker, C.C., Yaari, M., 1966, Neoclassical growth with fixed factor
productions, Review of Economic Studies, 33, 79-115.
[70] Tro¨ltzsch, F., On the semigroup approach for the optimal control of semilinear parabolic equations
including distributed and boundary control. Z. Anal. Anwendungen 8 (1989), no. 5, 431443.
[71] Tro¨ltzsch, F., Trltzsch, Fredi Optimal control of partial differential equations. Theory, methods and
applications. Translated from the 2005 German original by Jrgen Sprekels. Graduate Studies in
Mathematics, 112. American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, 2010.
[72] Xepapadeas, A. De Zeeuw, A., 1999, Environmental policy and competitiveness: the Porter Hy-
pothesis and the composition of capital, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
37,165-182.
[73] J. Yong, X.Y. Zhou, “Stochastic controls. Hamiltonian systems and HJB equations. Applications of
Mathematics,” 43. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1999.
Equilibrium Distributions for Optimal Investment 51
[1]S. Faggian, Department of Economics, Universita´ “Ca’ Foscari” Venezia, Italy.
faggian@unive.it.
[2] Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Universita´ LUISS - “Guido Carli, I-00162, Roma,
Italy. fgozzi@luiss.it.
[3] CentER, Department of Econometrics & Operations Research, Tilburg University,
P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands; Department of Economics, University
of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, 2000 Antwerp 1, Belgium, kort@uvt.nl.
